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
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**AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN**  
**RED BOOK**



**OFFICIAL ENGLISH EDITION**  
**WITH AN**  
**INTRODUCTION**

A





## NOTE OF INTRODUCTION.

Ever since the Karageorgevitch Dynasty ascended Serbia's blood-stained throne, surrounded by the conspirators against King Alexander, the policy of the kingdom has been directed by various means and with varying intensity toward a hostile propaganda and a revolutionary agitation in those territories of Austria-Hungary which are inhabited by South-Slavs. This underground policy has been aimed at the forcible separation of these territories from the Dual Monarchy, when the general political situation should favor the attainment of the aspirations for the establishment of a Greater Serbia.

The bitter disappointment caused in Serbia by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which drove the Servian nation to the brink of war, shows plainly what ambitious hopes were entertained by Serbia and how near she thought herself to be to the goal.

In the spring of 1909, Russia, though assuming the part of the protecting power, considered her armaments not sufficiently advanced to support Serbia. Under the circumstances the Servian government decided to declare solemnly before Europe that it recognized the international situation created by the annexation as an act which had not affected Serbia's rights. The Servian government furthermore undertook to dissolve the irregular bands which had armed against the Dual Monarchy and to maintain good neighborly relations with the latter for the future.

The Austro-Hungarian government looked forward to the restoration of the peace and good understanding with Serbia which had prevailed under the Obrenovitch Dynasty. It hoped to be enabled to promote Serbia's interests in the friendly spirit which had been evidenced by Austria-Hungary at the Berlin Congress, when she successfully advocated the recognition of the independence of the kingdom. These Austro-Hungarian hopes were not to be fulfilled, however. Far from respecting the pledge of good neighborly relations, the Servian government permitted the Servian press to rouse unrestrained hatred against the Monarchy; it tolerated societies in Serbia which, under the leadership of high officers, functionaries, teachers and judges, publicly carried on an agitation aiming to precipitate a revolutionary outbreak in Austro-Hungarian territories; it permitted prominent officers of the Servian military and civil services to demoralize the public conscience to the point where assassination was regarded as a legitimate weapon against the adjoining monarchy. This subversive agitation led to a series of outrages against prominent Austrian and Hungarian officials and culminated

in the dastardly assassination of the heir apparent, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Instead of precipitating the disintegration of Austria-Hungary which our enemies had foolishly anticipated, however, the Prince's martyrdom rallied all the peoples of Austria-Hungary in fervent loyalty to the defence of the Habsburg Dynasty. The whole world now sees that the monarchy rests upon solid foundations, and that her sons are firmly united in the conviction that their dignity, self-respect and vital interests made it imperative to check Serbia's criminal agitation.

Convinced by experience of the duplicity of the Servian government, Austria-Hungary found only one method which promised a satisfactory settlement. That method was to demand from Serbia absolute guarantees that those implicated in the infamous murder would be punished and that the subversive agitation for a Greater Serbia would be suppressed.

Austria-Hungary's forbearance having been construed as an evidence of weakness, the Belgrade government had to be made to realize that the Dual Monarchy was prepared to go to any lengths to uphold her prestige and integrity; Serbia had to be taught that Austria-Hungary could not tolerate her policy of prevarication and ostensible compliance with the Austro-Hungarian demands, meant only to deceive the great powers while the Servians carried on their incendiary agitation. The necessity for decisive action was emphasized by the recollection of a similar act of duplicity and evasion successfully accomplished by Serbia after the solemn declaration of 1909. Every time that the monarchy called Serbia to account for her reprehensible campaign of disruption, the Belgrade government turned to the powers for protection and impunity. Under the circumstances there was but one way of safeguarding the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary and putting an end to the ever-recurring economic disturbance of the Dual Monarchy, without endangering the peace of Europe. From the very beginning the Imperial and Royal Government, wishing to reassure the Powers, declared that it did not intend to go beyond the protection of its legitimate interests, and that no territorial aggrandizement was contemplated. It was compelled, however, to insist upon a direct settlement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia within the designated restrictions. Russia's proposal to extend the time-limit for the Servian answer would have furnished the Belgrade government with the opportunity for underhanded procrastination, and would have opened the door to the intervention of other Powers on Serbia's behalf. An extension of the time-limit had, therefore, to be declined. Though Serbia's hostility was plainly proved by the fact, that before giving her ambiguous reply, she had ordered a general mobilization, still the Dual Monarchy did not declare war until another three days had elapsed.

The British government's suggestion that the Servian controversy be submitted to a conference of the Powers reached Vienna too late, as hostilities had already begun. This proposal, however, could by no means have safeguarded the Dual Monarchy's interests. Nothing less than the unconditional acceptance of Austria-Hungary's demands by the Belgrade government could have guaranteed even tolerable neighborly relations with Servia. On the other hand, the Entente Powers were guided by the wish to put aside Austria-Hungary's demands by means of a compromise. This method would have nullified the assurances required for the future correct behavior of Servia, which would thus have been encouraged to persist in her activities for the detachment of the southern territories from Austria-Hungary.

The demand that Servia punish the accomplices in the Serajevo murder who were on Servian soil, and live up to the obligations of a peaceful neighbor, was aimed solely at the protection of our dynasty and of the integrity of the Dual Monarchy from subversive agitations. The Austro-Hungarian government acted as the spokesman of the civilized world when it asserted that it could not permit murder to be employed with impunity in political strife, and that the peace of Europe ought not to be continually menaced by Servia's ambitious projects.

The Entente Powers, dominated by selfish motives, ignored the laws of public morality and sided with the guilty party; in so doing, they assumed a heavy responsibility. The Dual Monarchy had given ample proofs of its conservative policy and thoroughly peaceful disposition during the crisis of the Balkan wars, when the balance of power in the Peninsula underwent far-reaching changes; she, therefore deserved unrestricted confidence in the new situation. Had the Entente Powers accepted Austria-Hungary's assurances and adopted a policy of waiting, the general conflagration would have been averted. When the history of this war shall be written, it will place upon their shoulders the blame for the frightful disaster which their policy has brought upon the world.

The small Servian state would never have dared to carry on its disruptive agitation in the territories of a great power, had it not been assured of Russia's secret protection. Servia had tangible pledges that in the event of a clash with Austria-Hungary, the powerful Pan-Slavic party in Russia would bring the Czar's government to the active support of the movement for the establishment of a Greater Servia at the expense of the Dual Monarchy. Such a support was only a minor phase of the expansive policy of the Russia empire which, like an ever-extending glacier, has ground down tremendous territories and many peoples, whose religious freedom and languages it has suppressed. The essential and traditional feature of the ambi-

tious scheme of world-domination, of which the Servian agitation is only an incident, is the possession of the Dardanelles. Such an acquisition would make Russia predominant in the Near East, with exclusive political and commercial privileges.

Since the attainment of this purpose constituted a menace to the vital interests of both Austria-Hungary and Germany, it was bound to rouse their opposition; Russia's efforts were consequently directed toward weakening their capacity for resistance. This was to be attained by disrupting the powerful combination of the two countries which stood in Russia's way, and by isolating Germany. The first move was the creation of the Balkan League, designed to weaken Austria-Hungary, whose foundations as a great power were to be undermined by the Pan-Slav and Servian agitation in her border districts. As a preliminary step Turkey had to be crushed and driven out of Europe. By this act the power of the augmented Christian Balkan States was to be made available for Russia's struggle against the two central European powers.

When the Balkan League was rent asunder by the dispute over the distribution of the territories wrested from Turkey, the "protecting power" of the Slavs assented to the defeat and humiliation of Bulgaria, who was deprived of the greater part of her recent conquests. New inducements were now offered for the reconstitution of the Balkan League by the promise of territorial expansion at the expense of Austria-Hungary. After the defeat of Turkey, the Balkan Federation could be directed solely against Austria-Hungary and Germany. Russia and France conceived this plan, which was to shift Europe's balance of power. In this criminal game of Russian diplomacy, which threatened the peace of Europe and the existence of the Dual Monarchy, Serbia was a trump card in Russia's hand, and Russia was determined not to lose this trump, even at the cost of a universal conflagration.

The following series of documents show that, up to the very last, the Imperial and Royal Government repeatedly assured the St. Petersburg cabinet that it did not intend to violate any Russian interest, or to seize Servian territory, or to infringe upon Serbia's sovereign rights, and that it was willing to enter into negotiations with the Russian government for the adjustment of Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests. These solemn assurances, however, did not satisfy the Russian government which, as early as the 24th of July, adopted a threatening tone in a public statement on the issues involved.

Though Austria-Hungary had not mobilized a single soldier against Russia, the latter ordered on July 29th a mobilization of the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan, which implied a threat against the Dual Monarchy. In spite of the repeated warnings of the Imperial and Royal Ambassador in St. Petersburg and

the intimation by the German government on the 26th of July that preparatory military measures in Russia would compel Germany to take corresponding steps, and that mobilization would mean war, the Russian general mobilization order was issued on the 31st of July.

On the 24th of July the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador met the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and emphatically pointed out the thoroughly peaceful disposition of the Dual Monarchy. He explained that Austria-Hungary only wished to put an end to the dangerous Servian policy of murderous outrages and of revolutionary agitation.

The vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake, and she had to protect herself; she could not abandon her defensive policy even if Russia should choose to provoke a collision by taking Serbia under her protection. The Imperial and Royal Government had no choice but to endeavor to put an end to an intolerable situation wherein Serbia, in effect, would have continued its provocations under a Russian pledge of immunity.

On the 30th of July the British Foreign Secretary once more suggested that Austria-Hungary accept the good offices of mediating powers in her controversy with Serbia. The Imperial and Royal Government, animated by a sincere desire to do its utmost to preserve the world's peace, agreed to accept this mediation. Austria-Hungary's honor and interests, however, demanded that this should not be done under the pressure of Russia's threatening measures. She, therefore, had to insist that Russia's order of mobilization should be revoked prior to Austria-Hungary's acceptance of mediation. The St. Petersburg cabinet responded by issuing the general call to the colors.

In coöperation with Great Britain's selfish policy and France's craving for *revanche*, the Russian government had left nothing undone to place Europe under the domination of the Entente Powers and thus to open the way for her own bold schemes.

Russia has resorted to most unscrupulous methods in her efforts to twist a rope around the Monarchy's neck. When Austria-Hungary, acting in self-defence, set about to sever this rope, Russia tried to tie her hands and to humiliate her.

Threatened in their most vital interests, Austria-Hungary and Germany had to choose between protecting their security and surrendering to the Russian menace. They chose the way which honor and duty prescribed.

## PERSONAGES REFERRED TO IN THE RED BOOK.

COUNT BERCHTOLD.....	Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
M. BIENVENU-MARTIN.....	French Minister of Justice and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs.
COUNT CLARY.....	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Brussels.
M. DOUMERGUE.....	French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. DUMAINE.....	French Ambassador at Vienna.
COUNT ERREMBAUT DE DUDZEELE .....	Belgian Minister at Vienna.
BARON VON GIESL.....	Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.
SIR EDWARD GREY.....	British Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs.
HERR HOFLEHNER.....	Acting Consul for Austria-Hungary at Nish.
PRINCE HOHENLOHE.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, successor to Count Szögyény.
PRINCE KUDASCHEFF.....	Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna.
BARON VON MACCHIO.....	Under-Secretary of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office.
COUNT MENSENDORFF.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London.
BARON MÜLLER.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Tokio.
M. PACHITCH.....	Servian Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
COUNT POURTALÉS.....	German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
RITTER VON STORCK.....	Austro-Hungarian Councilor of Legation at Belgrade.
M. SAZONOW.....	Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. SCHEBEKO.....	Russian Ambassador at Vienna.
GENERAL SUCHOMLINOW..	Russian Minister of War.
COUNT SZÁPÁRY.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg.
COUNT SZÉCSEN.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris.
COUNT SZÖGYÉNY.....	Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin. Predecessor to Prince Hohenlohe.
HERR VON TSCHIRSCHKY..	German Ambassador at Vienna.
M. VIVIANI.....	Premier of France.

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## **I.**

**Von Storck to Count Berchtold.**

**Belgrade, June 29, 1914.**

Still under the profound impression of the ghastly outrage of yesterday, I find it difficult to comment upon the bloody deed of Serajevo in the calm, self-possessed manner befitting the seriousness of the occasion. I therefore beg to be allowed to confine myself to-day to a mere record of some facts.

Yesterday, the 15th/28th, the anniversary of the battle of Kossovopolje was celebrated with more than usual pomp, and the memory of the Servian patriot, Milosh Obilitch, who in 1389 treacherously assassinated the victorious Murad, was solemnized. Wherever Servians live, Obilitch is counted a national hero. Yet, as a result of the propaganda fostered under the auspices of the Servian government and of a press campaign carried on for many years past, we have been substituted for the Turks as Serbia's hereditary foes.

In the minds of the three juvenile assassins of Serajevo (Princip, Gabrinovitch and the third unknown bomb-thrower) must have loomed up the glamor of a re-enactment of the tragedy of Kossovopolje. They have even shot and killed an innocent woman, and therefore may have considered that they have surpassed their model.

For years hatred against the Dual Monarchy has been sown in Servia. The seed has taken and the harvest is murder.

The news became known at about 5 P. M., and at 10 o'clock that night the Servian government officially ordered the celebration of the Obilitch anniversary to be stopped. Unofficially, however, and under the cover of darkness, the festivities were kept up for some time.

According to eye-witnesses people embraced each other in delight and jubilant remarks were heard, such as: "Serves them right!" "We expected it for a long time!" "That's the revenge for the annexation!"

## **II.**

**Von Storck to Count Berchtold.**

**Belgrade, June 30, 1914.**

(Telegram.)

I presented to-day to M. Gruitch, the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, the pertinent inquiry as to what steps the royal police

had taken, or intended to take, in an effort to trace the threads of the outrage, which notoriously led into Serbia.

His reply was that, so far, the Servian police had not even taken the matter up.

### III.

#### Consul General Jehlitschka to Count Berchtold.

Üsküb, July 1, 1914.

On June the 15th/28th, the Vidov Dan (Corpus Christi Day) which this year co-incided with the 525th anniversary of the battle of Kossovopolje fought in 1389, was for the first time officially celebrated at Pristina as the feast of the "Liberation of the Servian nation."

For four months a special committee had been working to make that festival as solemn as possible and to turn it into a great national Serb demonstration.

In preparation for the forthcoming festivities a propaganda had been extended into Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia and especially into Hungary. Those desirous of taking part in the festivities were granted free passage on the Servian state railways, and the authorities promised them cheap lodging, food and other assistance. The agitation had been energetic and well planned. The guests were taken to Pristina on special trains.

The various speeches reveled in historical reminiscences connected with the scene of the celebration, and invariably led up to and dwelt upon the customary topic of the unification of all Serbs and the "liberation of the oppressed brethren" across the Danube and the Save, including those who live in Bosnia and Dalmatia.

During the evening hours, news of the terrible deed of Serajevo began to spread and the fanatic populace gave itself up to a spontaneous outburst of passion, which, to judge by the numerous utterances of approval reported to me from absolutely reliable sources, must be described as positively inhuman.

In view of this attitude, which was also taken up by the population of Üsküb, and in consideration of the fact that the news of the crime has been received with unconcealed satisfaction by a representative gathering, all attempts of the Servian press to shift from Serbia the moral responsibility for the deed crumbled to pitiable nothing.

### IV.

#### Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram)

Paris, July 4, 1914.

I conveyed to-day to M. Poincaré, the Imperial and Royal Government's thanks for his sympathy.

Referring to the anti-Servian demonstrations in our country, he remarked that after the assassination of President Carnot all Italians were exposed to the most violent attacks at the hands of the population throughout France.

I drew his attention to the fact that the assassination to which he referred had no connection whatever with any anti-French agitation in Italy, whereas it can no longer be denied that for many years past a campaign has been waged in Servia against the Dual Monarchy, availing itself of all means, legitimate and illegitimate.

In concluding the interview M. Poincaré expressed his firm conviction that the Servian government would lend us every assistance in the judicial investigation and prosecution of persons suspected as accomplices. He added: "No State could evade such a duty."

## V.

### Acting Consul Hoflehner to Count Berchtold.

Nish, July 6, 1914.

At Nish the news of the terrible outrage of Serajevo has caused a sensation in the full sense of the word. No signs of consternation or indignation could be seen, however. A feeling of satisfaction and even of joy was predominant, and was often manifested in an unconcealed manner. So little restraint was put on the public feeling, that many instances of coarse expression could be recorded. This chiefly applies to the so-called leading circles and educated classes, such as politicians, teachers, government officials, officers and students. The business community remained more reserved.

All declarations made from Servian official quarters and by prominent individuals expressing indignation at the outrage and condemning the deed, appear merely as irony to those who have had the opportunity to observe at close quarters the sentiments of the educated classes during the past few days.

Toward nine o'clock on the day of the outrage I proceeded to a local café, still ignorant of what had happened. A gentleman of my acquaintance informed me of the persistent rumors of the crime. It was revolting to witness the elation displayed by the numerous guests, who discussed the event with evident satisfaction. Exclamations of joy and mockery were heard, which could not have failed to painfully affect even those who had been hardened by the customary political fanaticism of the Servians.

## VI.

### Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.

Belgrade, July 21, 1914.

Some time has passed since my return to my post after the unfortunate crime of June 28th, and I may now venture to give my estimate of the prevailing public feeling in Servia.

Since the annexation crisis, the relations between the Dual Monarchy and Servia have been strained by the jingoism and animosity of the latter and by an effective propaganda for the "Great Servian" cause, carried on in those parts of our country which are inhabited by Serbs. Servia's successes in the Balkan wars have intensified that jingoism, until it now manifests itself at times in outbreaks of frantic passion bordering upon madness.

I consider it superfluous to adduce proofs or instances. They may be obtained at any time and everywhere, in political circles as well as among the populace, without distinction of party. I affirm it as an established axiom that Servia's policy has but one aim, namely, the detachment from the Dual Monarchy of all territories inhabited by South-Slavs and the eventual destruction of that monarchy as a great power. Nobody who has spent a week in the discharge of his duties in this political atmosphere can question the truth of my assertion.

The latest political events have vastly increased the existing hatred against the Dual Monarchy. I here refer to the crime of Serajevo, Hartwig's death and the electoral campaign.

The outrage of Serajevo has evoked before the Servian people visions of the impending disintegration of the Habsburg Empire. They have been led to believe that the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian territories in question was to be expected shortly, that a revolution had broken out in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the loyalty of the Slav regiments could not be relied upon. Thus the event introduced a certain system into the scheme of mad nationalism, and invested it with a semblance of justification.

In the eyes of the Servians the hated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy has become powerless, and is henceforth hardly worth a military effort. Hatred is now accompanied by contempt. Without any further trouble exhausted Austria-Hungary would fall helplessly into the lap of the Greater Servian Empire which before long would come into being.

Papers, which certainly may not be classed among the most radical publications, emphasize in daily articles the impotence and disintegration of the neighboring monarchy, and without fear of punishment insult our authorities, including the august person of our sovereign. The press organ of the government points to the internal conditions in Austria-Hungary as the sole cause of the damnable crime. The dread of a future settling of accounts has vanished. For decades the Servian people have been entirely under the influence of the press, and the press of the ruling party determines the national policy. The outrage of Serajevo is the horribly abortive product of this influence of the press,

I shall pass over the absurd accusations raised on the occasion of Hartwig's death, utterances verging on madness, which the London "Times" qualified as "raging mad." Nor shall I dwell upon the mendacious press campaign which endeavors to confirm the Servian people in their conviction that the government of Austria-Hungary as well as its representatives are outlawed. Terms like "murderers," "rascals" or "infamous Austrians" were some of the ornamental by-words applied to us.

Hartwig's death, which meant a profound bereavement to the Servian political world, has been followed by a fanatic cult of the departed. This sentiment, however, was due not only to gratitude for his assistance in the past, but to a sense of apprehension as to the future. Every effort was made to please Russia by a display of slave-like servility, in order to secure that country's good-will for the future.

The third important factor is the electoral campaign. A common platform of hostility to the Dual Monarchy has united all parties. No party aspiring to the powers of government, therefore, would risk exposing itself to the suspicion of weakly yielding to Austria-Hungary. Thus the electoral campaign is waged under the watch-word of battle against Austria-Hungary.

It is generally believed that, for reasons internal as well as external, the Dual Monarchy is utterly powerless and incapable of any energetic action. Solemn warnings emanating from our competent sources are regarded as mere bluff.

The leave of absence granted to the Austro-Hungarian war minister and to the chief of the general staff have confirmed the conviction that the weakness of Austria-Hungary is now evident.

In imposing upon your patience with this lengthy report, I am fully aware that I am presenting nothing new; but I consider this exposition essential to the inevitable conclusion that a settlement with Serbia, involving a war not only for the preservation of Austria-Hungary's position as a great power, but even for her very existence, cannot be permanently avoided.

If we neglect to clear up our relations with Serbia, we shall lay ourselves open to blame for increased difficulties and disadvantages in a future conflict which, sooner or later, is bound to come.

In the view of an official representative of the Austro-Hungarian government, who is observing events on the spot, the realization is inevitable that we cannot afford to permit any further diminution of our prestige.

Should we decide to make far-reaching demands, with effective control of their execution (and such measures alone could clean the Augean Stable of Greater Servian intrigues), we would have to consider all possible consequences. From the very outset we must be firmly resolved to persevere in our attitude.

Half measures, demands, endless debating and finally a foul compromise, would be the hardest blow to Austria-Hungary's authority in Servia and her standing as a great power in Europe.

## VII.

Count Berchtold to Baron von Giesl, Belgrade.

Vienna, July 22, 1914.

You are directed to hand the following note to the Royal Government, in the course of the afternoon of Thursday, July 23rd:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Servian Minister in Vienna, on instructions from the Servian Government, made the following declaration to the Imperial and Royal Government:

"Servia recognizes that the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia has not affected her rights, and consequently she will conform to such decisions as the Powers may take with regard to article XXV. of the treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Servia undertakes to renounce henceforth the attitude of protest and opposition which she has adopted with regard to the annexation since last autumn. She undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her present policy toward Austria-Hungary and to live in future on good neighborly terms with the latter."

The history of recent years, and in particular the painful events of the 28th of June last, have disclosed the existence of a subversive movement with the object of detaching a part of the territories of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy. The movement, which had its birth under the eye of the Servian government, has gone so far as to make itself manifest beyond the Servian frontier in the shape of acts of terrorism and a series of outrages and murders.

Far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government has done nothing to repress this movement. It has tolerated the criminal activity of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, the licentious language of the press, the glorification of the authors of outrages, and the participation of officers and functionaries in subversive agitation. It has permitted an unwholesome propaganda in public instruction. In short, it has permitted all manifestations of a nature to incite the Servian population to hatred of the Monarchy and contempt for its institutions.

This culpable tolerance of the Royal Servian government had not ceased at the moment when the events of the 28th of June last demonstrated its ominous consequences to the world.

It is evident from the depositions and confessions of the criminal perpetrators of the outrage of the 28th of June, that the Serajevo assassination has been planned in Belgrade, that the arms and ex-

plosives with which the murderers were provided, had been given to them by Servian officers and functionaries belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, and finally that the passage into Bosnia of the criminals and their arms was organized and carried out by the Chiefs of the Servian frontier service.

The above mentioned results of the preliminary investigation do not permit the Austro-Hungarian government to pursue any longer the attitude of expectant forbearance which it has maintained for years in the face of machinations hatched in Belgrade, and thence propagated in the territories of the Monarchy. The results, on the contrary, impose upon it the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquility of the Monarchy.

To achieve this end, the Imperial and Royal government finds itself compelled to demand from the Royal Servian government a formal assurance that it condemns this dangerous propaganda against the Monarchy—in other words, the whole series of tendencies, the ultimate aim of which is to detach from the Monarchy territories belonging to it—and that it undertakes to suppress by every means as its disposal this criminal and terrorist propaganda.

In order to give a solemn character to this undertaking the Royal Servian Government shall publish on the front page of its "journal official," of the 26th of June (13th July) the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, of which the final aim is to detach from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal proceedings.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforward it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration shall simultaneously be communicated to the royal army as an order of the day by His Majesty the King, and published in the Official Bulletin of the army.

The Royal Servian Government further undertakes:

1. To suppress any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity;

2. To dissolve immediately the society called Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate all its means of propaganda, and to proceed in the same manner against all other societies and their branches in Servia which engage in propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The Royal Government shall take the necessary measures to prevent the societies dissolved from continuing their activity under another name and form;

3. To eliminate without delay from public instruction in Servia, both as regards the teaching body and the methods of instruction, everything that serves, or might serve, to foment the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. To remove from the military service, and from the administration in general, all officers and functionaries guilty of propaganda against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserves the right of communicating to the Royal Government;

5. To accept the coöperation in Servia of representatives of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy;

6. To take judicial proceedings against accomplices in the plot of the 28th of June who are on Servian territory. Delegates of the Austro-Hungarian Government will take part in the investigation relating thereto;

7. To proceed without delay to the arrest of Major Voijs Tankositch and of the individual named Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employee, who have been compromised by the results of the preliminary investigation at Serajevo;

8. To prevent by effective measures the participation of the Servian authorities in the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss and punish severely the officials of the frontier service at Schabatz and Loznica who have been guilty of having assisted the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime by facilitating their passage across the frontier;

9. To furnish the Imperial and Royal Government with explanations regarding the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, both in Servia and abroad, who, notwithstanding their official positions did not hesitate after the crime of the 28th of June to give utterance, in published interviews, to expressions of hostility to the Austro-Hungarian Government; and finally,

10. To notify the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised under the preceding heads.



The Austro-Hungarian Government awaits the reply of the Royal Government at the latest by 6 o'clock on Saturday evening, the 25th of July.

A memorandum dealing with the results of the preliminary investigation at Serajevo with regard to the officials mentioned under heads 7 and 8 is attached to this note.

(INCLOSURE.)

The investigation by the court at Serajevo against Gabrilo Princip and accomplices in the assassination committed on June 28 of this year has up to now established the following facts:

1. The plot to murder Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Serajevo was planned by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Trifko Grabez, with the assistance of Major Voja Tankositch.

2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols, with their ammunition, which were used by the criminals were obtained for them and handed to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez in Belgrade by a certain Milan Ciganovitch, and Major Voja Tankositch.

3. The bombs are hand grenades which come from the arsenal of the Servian army at Kragujevac.

4. In order to make sure of the success of the attempt, Milan Ciganovitch instructed Princip, Gabrinovitch and Grabez in the art of hurling bombs and taught Princip and Grabez how to shoot with Browning pistols in a forest adjoining the shooting range of Topschider, in Belgrade.

5. In order to make possible the crossing of the Bosnia-Herzegovina frontier by the conspirators and the smuggling in of their weapons, a secret transportation system was organized by Ciganovitch. The entrance of the criminals with their weapons into Bosnia and Herzegovina was carried out with the assistance of the frontier Captains at Schabatz (Rade Popovitch) and at Loznica, and the coöperation of the customs officer, Rudivoj Grbitch of Loznica, and several other persons.

In presenting the above note you will add verbally that you are instructed to leave Belgrade with the staff of the legation at the expiration of the time-limit mentioned in the note (forty-eight hours after the hour and day of its presentation) in the event that within that period you have not received an unconditional and favorable response from the Royal Servian government.

## VIII.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors at  
Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and  
Constantinople.**

**Vienna, July 22, 1914.**

The Imperial and Royal Government has found itself obliged to address on Thursday, the 23rd instant, through the Imperial and Royal Minister at Belgrade, the following note to the Royal Government of Servia. (See instructions to the Imperial and Royal Ministry at Belgrade of July 22, 1914).

I have the honor to request you to bring the contents of this note to the attention of the government to which you are accredited, accompanying this communication with the following comment:

On the 31st of March, 1909, the Royal Servian Government addressed to Austria-Hungary the declaration of which the text is reproduced above.

On the very day after this declaration Servia embarked on a policy of instilling revolutionary ideas into the minds of Serb subjects of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and so initiating activities for detachment of the Austro-Hungarian territory adjoining the Servian frontier.

Servia became the focus of a criminal agitation.

No time was lost in the formation of societies and groups whose object, either avowed or secret, was the creation of disorders on Austro-Hungarian territory. These societies and groups count among their membership generals and diplomats, government officials and judges—in short, men at the top of official and unofficial society in the kingdom.

Servian journalism is almost entirely at the service of this propaganda, which is directed against Austria-Hungary, and not a day passes without the organs of the Servian press inciting their readers to hatred and contempt for the neighboring Monarchy, or to outrages directed more or less openly against its security and integrity.

A large number of agents are employed in carrying on by every means the agitation against Austria-Hungary and corrupting the youth in the frontier provinces.

Since the recent Balkan crisis there has been a recrudescence of the spirit of conspiracy inherent in Servian politicians, which has left such sanguinary imprints on the history of the kingdom. Individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia have come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist propaganda against Austria-Hungary.

In the face of these activities, to which Austria-Hungary has been exposed for years, the Servian Government has not thought it incumbent on it to take the slightest step. The Servian Government has thus failed in the duty imposed on it by the solemn declaration of the 31st of March, 1909, and has acted in opposition to the will of Europe and the undertaking given to Austria-Hungary.

The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government in the face of the provocative attitude of Servia was inspired by the territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the hope that the Servian Government would end in spite of everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its true value. By observing an attitude of good will toward the political interests of Servia, the Imperial and Royal Government hoped that the Kingdom would finally decide to follow an analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the political ideas of Servia when, after the events of 1912, the Imperial and Royal Government by its disinterested and ungrudging attitude, made so considerable an aggrandizement of Servia possible.

The good will which Austria-Hungary showed toward the neighboring State had no restraining effect on the conduct of the Kingdom, which continued to tolerate on its territory a propaganda of which the deplorable consequences were demonstrated to the world on the 28th of June last, when the heir apparent to the Monarchy and his illustrious consort fell victims to a plot hatched in Belgrade.

In the face of this state of things the Imperial and Royal Government has felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at Belgrade with a view to inducing the Servian Government to stop the incendiary movement which is menacing the security and integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The Imperial and Royal Government is convinced that, in taking this step, it will find itself in full accord with the sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide to become a weapon to be employed with impunity in political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade.

In support of the above the Imperial and Royal Government holds at the disposal of the government to which you are accredited a dossier recording the Servian machinations and showing the connection between these machinations and the murder of the 28th of June. An identical communication has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal Representatives accredited to the other signatory Powers.

You are authorized to place a copy of this dispatch in the hands of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

## IX.

**Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.**

(Telegram)

Vienna, July 23, 1914.

As England is the most likely of the Entente Powers to be brought to an unprejudiced judgment of our present move in Belgrade, I request your Excellency to point out among other things in the conversation which you will have at the Foreign Office on the 24th instant, following the presentation of the circular note, that it was within the power of Servia to avert the serious steps she had reason to expect from our side, if she had spontaneously begun within her own territory proceedings against the Servian accomplices in the murderous attack of the 28th of June, and to disclose the threads of the plot, leading, as it has been proved, from Belgrade to Serajevo.

Until to-day the Servian Government, in spite of much notorious circumstantial evidence pointing to Belgrade, not only has failed to do anything of that sort, but even has endeavored to efface the existing traces.

According to a telegraphic report from our Legation in Belgrade, the Servian State employee Ciganovitch, who is compromised by the corroborating depositions of the assassins, was still in Belgrade on the day of the murder; but when his name appeared in the newspapers three days later, he had left the town. At the same time the head of the Servian Press Bureau declared Ciganovitch to be absolutely unknown in Belgrade.

As to the short time limit of our demands, it is based upon our long-standing experience with Servian proficiency in procrastination.

We cannot allow our demands, which, as a matter of fact do not contain anything unusual in the intercourse between states which ought to be living in peace and friendship, to become the object of negotiations and compromises; and, with due regard to our economic interests, we cannot accept a political method which would enable Servia to prolong the crises at her pleasure.

## X.

**Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram)

London, July 24, 1914.

Circular note just presented to Sir Edward Grey, who perused it attentively. With regard to No. 5 he asked for explanations, as the installation of Austrian officials in Servia impressed him as equivalent to the termination of Servia's independent sovereignty. I replied that coöperation of police officials, as in this instance, would not infringe upon the sovereignty of the State.

He regretted the brevity of the time-limit, which made it impossible to calm the first irritation and to induce Belgrade to give us a satisfactory reply. There would be time enough for an ultimatum should the answer prove unacceptable, he thought.

I explicitly pointed out our position. (Necessity to proceed against subversive agitation which threatened parts of the Monarchy; defence of our most vital interests, most complete failure of the conciliatory attitude we have shown up to now in our dealings with Serbia, which has had more than three weeks' time to institute a spontaneous inquiry concerning complicity in the murder, and so on).

The Secretary of State repeated his apprehension with regard to the short time limit, but he admitted that what has been said about the complicity in the murder of Serajevo was justified, as are some of our demands.

He would be quite willing to regard the whole affair as concerning solely Austria-Hungary and Serbia. Yet he is very "apprehensive" of the possibility that several great Powers might be involved in war. Speaking of Russia, Germany and France, he remarked that the provisions of the Franco-Russian Alliance are probably somewhat similar to those of the Triplice. I explained at length our point of view, and I repeated with emphasis that in this case we would have to remain firm in order to get some guarantees, as Servian promises hitherto never have been redeemed. I could appreciate his considering primarily the effect of our act upon the peace of Europe, but indicated that, in order to understand our point of view, he ought to put himself in our place.

He did not wish to enter into a further discussion of this subject, and said it would be necessary for him to study the note more carefully. As a preliminary step he will confer with the German and the French Ambassadors, as he feels obliged to obtain an exchange of views first of all with the allies of Austria-Hungary and Russia, who, however, have no direct interests in Serbia.

## XI.

### Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram)

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Have just read your instructions of the 22nd instant to the Minister of Justice, who is in charge of the affairs of the absent Foreign Secretary, and left a copy with him. M. Bienvenu-Martin, who was vaguely acquainted with our step in Belgrade through the reports in this morning's papers, seemed considerably impressed with my information. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the text, he readily admitted that recent events, and the attitude of the Servian Government, have made our energetic intervention appear intelligible.

Demand No. 5 of our note presented in Belgrade seemed especially to strike the Minister, as he asked me to read it again. The Minister thanked me for the communication, which, he said, would be studied closely. I took the occasion to emphasize the point that the issue was one to be dealt with exclusively by Serbia and ourselves, but that it would be to the general advantage of Europe if the unrest perpetuated for years by the Servian agitation against us were, at last, to be replaced by a clearly defined political situation. I pointed out that all friends of peace and order, among whom I am counting France in the foremost place, should earnestly advise Serbia to change her attitude fundamentally and to meet our legitimate demands.

The Minister conceded that it is the duty of Serbia to proceed energetically against any accomplices of the assassins of Serajevo, which duty she would not be likely to evade. Emphasizing the sympathy of France with Austria-Hungary, and the good relations between the two countries, he expressed the hope that the controversy would be settled peacefully and in accordance with our desires.

The Minister avoided every attempt to palliate or defend the attitude of Serbia.

## XII.

### Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram)

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Baron Schoen, following out his instructions, will declare to-day that our dispute with Serbia is regarded by the Berlin Cabinet as an affair concerning solely Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

In connection with this information, he will make it understood that, should a third power try to intervene, Germany, true to the obligations of her Alliance, would be found on our side.

## XIII.

### Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram)

Paris, July 24, 1914.

Baron Schoen has just taken the step enjoined upon him. M. Bienvenu Martin told him that he could not yet give a definite reply, although he was prepared to say at the outset that the French Government shared our opinion that our controversy with Serbia concerned only Vienna and Belgrade, and that hopes were entertained that the question would find a direct and peaceful solution.

The Servian Minister here has been advised that his Government should yield on all points as much as possible, yet with the restriction: "As long as her rights of sovereignty were not touched."

Baron Schoen emphasized the necessity, from the European point of view, of eliminating, at last, the center of unceasing disturbance in Belgrade.

## XIV.

## Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs received me with the remark that he knew the object of my visit, and declared that he would not define his position at once. I began to read my instructions to him. He first interrupted me when the series of murderous attempts was mentioned. My explanation was met with the question whether it had been proved that all those attempts originated in Belgrade. I emphasized the fact that they were the outcome of Servian instigation. In the further course of the reading he remarked that he knew what it all was about; that we intended to make war on Serbia and this was to be the pretext. I replied that our attitude during the last few years was sufficient evidence that we neither sought nor needed such pretexts. The solemn declarations demanded from Serbia did not evoke any objection from the Minister; he only repeated again and again that Pasitch already had expressed himself in the sense demanded by us, and interjected: "He will say that twenty-five times if you wish." I told him that no one in Austria was trying to infringe upon the integrity of Serbia or her dynasty. M. Sazonow most vigorously declared himself against the dissolution of the "Narodna Odbrana," which he assured me Serbia would never undertake. The Minister also objected to the proposed coöperation of Imperial and Royal officials in the suppression of the subversive propaganda. Serbia then, he pointed out, would no longer be mistress in her own house! "After that you will want to interfere again and again, and what will the life of Europe be like?" he asked. I replied: "It will be quieter than hitherto, if Serbia shows some good will."

The observations with which I accompanied the reading of the note were listened to by the Minister rather calmly. Our belief that our feelings in the matter were shared by all civilized nations, he declared to be erroneous. With all the emphasis of which I was capable, I pointed out how deplorable it would be if we were to fail to meet with a sympathetic response in Russia in a situation imperiling all that was most sacred to us as well as to Russia, whatever the Minister might choose to say. He endeavored to belittle the monarchical aspect of the question.

With regard to the dossier held at the disposal of the governments, M. Sazonow wondered why we had taken the trouble, since we already had issued an ultimatum. This proved conclusively, to his mind, that we did not desire an impartial investigation of the case. I replied that the results of our own inquiry were sufficient to justify our proceedings in an affair solely concerning Austria-Hungary and Serbia, but that, having nothing to conceal, we were quite willing to furnish the Powers with all the information they might desire.

M. Sazonow observed that, the ultimatum having been issued, he had no further interest in the proffered information. He presented the case in such a way as to make it appear that we were seeking a war with Serbia under any circumstances. I replied that we are the most peace loving power in the world, and that all we want is to safeguard our territory from foreign revolutionary intrigues and to protect our dynasty from bombs.

In the course of further discussion, M. Sazonow once more made the remark that we had certainly created a serious situation. In spite of the comparative calmness of the Minister's manner, his attitude was throughout one of negation and antagonism.

## XV.

### Communiqué in the Russian Official Gazette.

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

The St. Petersburg Telegraphic Agency reports:

The Official Gazette publishes the following communication:

The Imperial Government, gravely alarmed by the surprising events in Belgrade and by the ultimatum addressed to Serbia by Austria-Hungary, is following attentively the development of the Austro-Hungarian-Servian conflict, to which Russia cannot remain indifferent.

## XVI.

### Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram)

St. Petersburg, July 24, 1914.

After the Ministers had been in session for five hours, M. Sazonow received the German Ambassador in the course of the evening and had a long conference with him.

The Minister, probably as a result of the meeting of the Cabinet, advanced the opinion that the controversy between Austria-Hungary and Serbia was by no means a matter that could be confined to these two States, but that it involved all Europe, inasmuch as the compromise arrived at in consequence of the Servian declaration in 1909 had been brought about under the auspices of the whole of Europe.

The Minister stated emphatically that he was affected in a particularly unpleasant way by the circumstance that Austria-Hungary had offered to submit a dossier for examination at a time when an ultimatum already had been sent to Serbia. Russia would demand an international examination of the dossier which we had placed at the Minister's disposal. My German colleague at once drew M. Sazonow's attention to the fact that Austria-Hungary would not accept an intervention in her differences with Serbia, nor would Germany consent to a suggestion incompatible with the dignity of her ally as a great power.



In course of the conversation the Minister stated that Russia could not remain indifferent to Austria-Hungary's possible intention to "*dévor*er la Serbie" (absorb Serbia). Count Pourtalés retorted that he did not assume such an intention on the part of Austria-Hungary, and that any such purpose would be contrary to the Monarchy's own interests. Austria-Hungary only considered it necessary to inflict a fully deserved chastisement upon Serbia. M. Sazonow expressed his doubts as to whether Austria-Hungary would abide by such a declaration.

The conversation ended with an appeal by M. Sazonow that Germany coöperate with Russia for the maintenance of the peace. The German Ambassador assured the Minister that Germany had no desire to precipitate a war, but that she naturally would defend her ally's interests without reservation.

## XVII.

### Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram)

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

Re your yesterday's telegram.

I request you to explain to Sir Edward Grey without delay that our representations of yesterday at Belgrade should not be regarded as a formal ultimatum, but merely as a note with a fixed time limit. You will give Sir Edward Grey the strictly confidential information, that, for the time being, the interruption of diplomatic relations with Serbia and the beginning of the necessary military preparations would be the only consequences if the time limit should expire without result. We are absolutely determined to exact satisfaction of our legitimate demands.

You are authorized to declare that we shall, however, be compelled to demand indemnification from Serbia for all expenses incurred in such military preparations, should Serbia, after the expiration of the stipulated time, yield only under the pressure of the aforesaid preparations. It must be remembered that we already have had to mobilize twice on account of Serbia, namely in 1908 and 1912.

## XVIII.

### Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 24, 1914.

I received the Russian Chargé d'Affaires this forenoon, and explained to him that I made a special point of informing him as early as possible of our step in Belgrade, and of acquainting him with our point of view in this matter. Prince Kudascheff thanked me for this mark of consideration, but did not conceal his uneasiness at our

summary proceeding toward Serbia. He pointed out that it was feared at St. Petersburg that our action would involve the humiliation of Serbia, an event to which Russia could not remain indifferent.

I endeavored to reassure the Russia Chargé d'Affaires on that score. I explained that our object was to obtain a readjustment of the intolerable attitude of Serbia toward the Monarchy. For this purpose we endeavored to induce the Servian Government to make public disavowal of the existing hostile agitation against the integrity of Austria-Hungary, and to suppress it by administrative measures. We also desired an opportunity to satisfy ourselves that the measures adopted would be conscientiously carried out.

I emphasized the dangers which the continuation of the Great Servian propaganda involved, not only to Austria-Hungary's integrity, but also to the equilibrium and the peace of Europe. I moreover pointed out that the safety of all dynasties and not least of all, the Russian, would be threatened if the conviction were to spread broadcast, that murder could be employed with impunity as a weapon in a chauvinistic agitation.

Finally, I pointed out that we did not aspire to territorial aggrandizement but merely desired the maintenance of the status quo; a point of view that should be understood by the Russian Government.

Prince Kudascheff then observed that he was unfamiliar with the views of his government and he did not know what attitude Serbia would take with regard to several of the demands.

In concluding our interview the Chargé d'Affaires undertook to bring to his government's knowledge the explanations I had given him concerning our action, and especially promised to mention our assurance that we did not intend to humiliate Serbia.

## XIX.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg and Constantinople.**

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

I have the honor to enclose herewith for you the dossier announced in the circular note to the Powers concerning the Pan-Servian propaganda and its connections with the Serajevo plot.

You will please communicate this dossier to the government to which you are accredited:

## MEMOIR.

The movement emanating from Serbia which aims at the detachment of the Southern Slav parts of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy to unite them with Serbia, extends far back into the past.

The propaganda on Servian soil, always the same in purpose, varying merely as to means and intensity, reached its climax during the crisis of the annexation. Divesting itself of the protecting cloak of secrecy, this propaganda at that juncture emerged with an open confession of its tendencies. Under the patronage of the Servian Government, it strove to attain its object by every means at its disposal. While on the one hand the entire Servian press clamored for war against the Monarchy in a series of broadsides wherein the fact were maliciously distorted, on the other hand associations were formed in preparation for a struggle. There were also other means of propaganda.

The Narodna Odbrana was the most important among these. Ostensibly organized as a private society, it was entirely dominated by the Belgrade Foreign Office through the officers and State functionaries on its roll of membership. Among its founders were the following: General Bozo Jankovitch, former State Secretaries Ljuba Jovanovitch, Ljuba Davidovitch and Velislav Vulovitch; Professor Zivojin Dacitch (Barcitch), director of the State Printing Office, and the then Captains, now Majors, Voja Tankositch and Milan Pribicevitch. This society devoted itself to the recruiting and equipment of bodies of volunteers for the coming war against the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. (See Enclosure 2).

As an illustration of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, the deposition of Trifko Krstanovitch, a subject of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a witness in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo, will be of interest. This man was then in Belgrade and had been hired by the Narodna Odbrana as a "Komitadji," together with other subjects of the Monarchy. With some hundred and forty other members of this band, Krstanovitch at the beginning of 1909 had been enrolled in a school established and managed by the Majors Voja Tankositch and Dusan Putnik in Cuprija (County of Jagodina) for the instruction and equipment of armed bands of men. In it all the instructors were Servian officers. General Bozo Jankovitch and Captain Milan Pribicevitch made regular inspections of this three-months' course of education in irregular warfare.

The future "Komitadjis" were there instructed in shooting, bomb-throwing, laying of mines, blowing up of railways, tunnels and bridges, and the destruction of telegraph lines. It was their task to apply their newly acquired knowledge in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the orders of their commanders.

Through these activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which were carried on openly and were supported by the Servian government, the guerilla warfare against Austria-Hungary was organized. Subjects of the Monarchy were induced to commit acts of treason against their own country and were systematically trained to make treacherous attacks upon the defences of their country as Servian emissaries.

This period of aggressions was terminated by the declaration of the Servian Government on the 31st of March, 1909, wherein the latter declared its willingness to abide by the new political order created by the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and solemnly pledged itself to maintain friendly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the future.

This declaration seemed to mark the end of the movement against Austria-Hungary, the source of so much unrest, and to point a path to a really friendly approach between Serbia and the Dual Monarchy. Deprived of the assistance of the Servian Government, and checked by the latter as in duty bound, the hostile propaganda would have been reduced to a mere shadowy existence, sure to vanish.

In such an event the kinship of Serbia with the Southern Slavs in the Dual Monarchy by race, language and traditions, would have stimulated a joint work of culture which would have been of common value to both countries. But expectations in this direction were not fulfilled.

The aspirations hostile to the Dual Monarchy remained in operation, and, under the very eyes of the Servian Government, which has done nothing to suppress this movement, the propaganda against Austria-Hungary was intensified. Rancor against the Dual Monarchy was kept at a high pitch, and by new instigations was made implacable.

In the same old way, adapted to the changed conditions and supplemented by new methods, the people of Serbia were roused to a struggle of extermination against Austria-Hungary. In a systematic manner secret meshes were woven to and fro in the Southern-Slav districts of the Dual Monarchy, and the citizens of the latter were corrupted to betray their country.

Above all other agencies, the Servian press has not ceased to work in this direction. No less than 81 Servian publications had to be excluded from Austria-Hungary because their contents were in flagrant violation of the provisions of the domestic criminal code.

There was hardly a provision enacted for the protection of the august person of the Sovereign, members of the dynasty and the integrity of the State, which was not violated by Servian newspapers. A few specimens of these too frequent press utterances, selected from an abundant crop of such matter and referring to various periods, are tabulated in Enclosure 1.

Without entering into a more minute discussion of these indications of public opinion in Serbia, it must be stated that they habitually referred to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as an act of robbery committed against Serbia and requiring remedy. This view is not only repeated over and over in the ultra-radical papers in all the degrees of filthy expression of which the Servian

language is capable, but which finds practically open utterance in the "Samouprava," a publication closely connected with the Belgrade Foreign Office. (See lit. C of Enclosure 1.)

Attention must be directed likewise to the manner in which the Servian press treated the murderous plot of Bogdan Zerajitch on June 15, 1910, in Serajevo against the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, General von Varesanin.

Zerajitch, as is known, committed suicide immediately after his deed, having previously reduced all his papers to ashes. Under these circumstances the motive of his plot could not be completely established. However, from a badge found on him, one might infer that he was a believer in Kropotkine's tenets. Investigation led to the conclusion that the crime rested on Anarchist foundations.

The press of Servia, nevertheless, extolled the assassin as a Servian national hero and glorified his deed. And the "Politika" even voiced a solemn protest against the assumption that Zerajitch was an anarchist, claiming him as an "heroic Serb whose name every Servian will cherish with sorrow."

The day of the 18th of August of the same year (the birthday of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty), was chosen as the appropriate occasion by the "Politika" for a resumption of its discussion of the plot of Zerajitch, whose name is uttered by the people as something sacred, and to publish a poem extolling this murderous attempt (lit. A of Enclosure 1).

Thus this crime, which had nothing to do with Servian aspirations to territories belonging to the Dual Monarchy, was utilized for the propagation of subversive ideas. Through the glorification of Zerajitch, murder was expressly commended as a model weapon in the struggle to realize Servian ideas, and as a deed worthy of emulation. This sanction of murder as a legitimate method in the fight against the Dual Monarchy recurs later in the press comments on the murderous attempt of Jukitch against the Royal Commissioner, M. von Cuvay (See lit. C of Enclosure 1).

These sheets were not only circulated in Servia, but, as will be shown hereafter, were also smuggled into the Monarchy through well-organized secret channels. It is these sheets that roused the masses and made them fertile soil for the activities of the associations antagonistic to the Monarchy.

The Narodna Odbrana became the focus of the agitation carried on by various organizations. The persons who had been at the head of this society at the time of the annexation were still its leaders. Now, as then, the most untiring and active organizers were the most violent enemies of the Dual Monarchy, to wit: General Bozo Jankovitch, Zivojin Dacitch, Director of the State Printing Office,

and the Majors Milan Pribicevitch and Voja Tankositch. In its broader organization, which was under a strict hierarchical rule (See Enclosure 2 under "Organization"), the Narodna Odbrana soon included about 400 committees, all of which displayed a lively activity.

Under the same leadership as when it was founded, the Narodna Odbrana became the centre of an agitation to which the Sharpshooters' Association, including 762 societies; the Sokolbund, with 2,500 members; the Olympian Club, the Equestrian Society, "Knez Mihajlo," the Jägerbund, the Kulturliga and numerous other societies belonged. Owing to a constant mutual interchange, these organizations were practically amalgamated and to-day their membership constitutes one body, the Narodna Odbrana.

Thus the Narodna Odbrana extended its close-meshed net of agitation over the whole of Servia, drawing to itself everybody who proved susceptible to the seduction of its ideas.

The spirit of the Narodna Odbrana is clearly disclosed by its official publications.

Disguised by its articles of association as a cultural organization, concerned solely with the intellectual and physical development of the population of Servia, as well as with its material betterment, the Narodna Odbrana betrays the true and only reason for its existence, by the publication in its organ of the following programme of reorganization: Under the pretext that the Dual Monarchy is seeking to despoil Servia of "her freedom and language and crush her utterly," the Odbrana pledges its members to preach to the people of Servia, "fanatically and untiringly," the "holy truth" that the waging of a war of extermination against Austria-Hungary, Servia's first and greatest enemy, is an imperative necessity; that this war must be carried on "with rifles and cannon," and that the people must be put in readiness "in every way" for "the struggle to liberate the oppressed territories where 7,000,000 of our enslaved brothers are suffering." (See Enclosure 2.)

The "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana are completely dominated by this idea. They are means to the end of organizing and educating the people for the longed-for struggle of extermination against the Dual Monarchy.

The same spirit animates all the societies affiliated with the Narodna Odbrana. The Sokol Societies in Kragujevac (See Enclosure 3) are a case in point.

Like the Narodna Odbrana itself, these affiliated organizations are under the direction of army officers, professors and state officials. The opening address which the president of the society, Major Kovacevitch, delivered in 1914, at the annual meeting, omits all mention of athletics, the main object of a Sokol Society, and deals exclusively with the "preparations for the struggle" against the

"dangerous, heartless, lustful, hateful and greedy enemy in the north," who is "depriving millions of Servian brothers of their freedom and rights and keeping them in slavery and chains."

In the report of the management of this society all references to the nominal objects of its activities are relegated to the background. The report only indicates the real aims of the executive committee, to wit: the promotion of the national evolution and the strengthening of the "suppressed people," to the end that they may carry out their programme and accomplish that "great deed" which will be achieved in the near future—"the liberation of the brothers across the Drina, who are suffering the torments of the crucified."

Even the treasurer makes use of his financial report to sound a warning that it is necessary to "train falcons" which would be able "to bring freedom to the brothers not yet liberated."

Like the "cultural aims" of the Narodna Odbrana, the "athletic sports" of the Sokols are not an end in themselves but a mere means to advance the same propaganda, which is carried on with the same idea, and even with the use of almost identical words.

The Narodna Odbrana, in inciting the "people" to the struggle of extermination against the Dual Monarchy, appeals not only to the masses in both Servia, but to all Southern-Slavs. To the Narodna Odbrana the Southern-Slav territories of the Monarchy represent "our conquered Servian dominions." (Also See Enclosure 4). Thus, the Southern-Slav subjects of the Dual Monarchy are asked to participate in this "national work," this "sound, vital work" beyond the Servian frontier. The Narodna Odbrana appeals for "heroes for this holy struggle" on the soil of the Dual Monarchy, where Obilitch, Sultan Murad's murderer, is pointed to as an example of national devotion, worthy of imitation.

To spur on the "brothers outside of Servia" to participate in the "work of private initiative," the Narodna Odbrana keeps in close touch with the "brothers across the frontier." Nothing is said in the official organs of the society about the nature of this connection, presumably because it belongs to that part of the "general work" which, for manifold reasons, is not to be disclosed.

How extensive this branch of their activity is, however, can be gathered from the fact that both the Central Committee of the Narodna Odbrana and some of its regional committees maintain their departments "for Foreign Affairs."

This "foreign" activity of the Narodna Odbrana and of its affiliations is many-sided.

Relatively the least dangerous means of this agitation, because amenable to the control of the authorities, are the lecture tours which prominent members of the Narodna Odbrana undertake to south-eastern parts of the Dual Monarchy, where they address various

societies on national and cultural subjects. On such occasions the opportunity is offered to the lecturer to recruit more or less openly for the above-mentioned societies, using words and expressions which carry a hidden meaning to the initiated.

In the ranks of these emissaries the above-mentioned director of the Servian State Printing Office, Zivojin Dacitch, plays a prominent part. Zivojin Dacitch had issued a proclamation to the Servian people on August 9, 1909, in which he designated Austria-Hungary as Servia's enemy and exhorted the country to prepare for the war against the Monarchy. He undertook many trips for purposes of agitation to the south-eastern parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. In one of these lectures, delivered in Karloci (1912), he abandoned his usual caution and advocated the "union of all Serbs against the common enemy." His references to Austria-Hungary in this instance lacked nothing in clearness.

More menacing were the relations which the Servian societies, imbued with the spirit of the Narodna Odbrana, entertained with organizations in the Monarchy under cover of a unity of interests and culture. The mutual visits of these societies, made either in a body or by delegates, could not be controlled by the police and authorities, and were utilized by Servia for the prosecution of many plans hostile to the Monarchy.

Thus, for instance, a delegate of the Narodna Odbrana at the notorious celebration of the Prosvjeta Society in Serajevo (September, 1912), did not hesitate to secretly enlist Bosnian members for his society. (See Enclosure 6). The delegating of a representative of the Sokol Society at Kragujevac to this celebration was meant to convey this message to the "Brethren in Bosnia": "We have not forgotten you; the wings of the falcons of the Sumadija are still powerful." As to the proceedings at such meetings in Servia, it is more difficult to report in detail. They are not under the control of the Imperial and Royal authorities, which have to collect their information at second-hand. (See Enclosure 3). In this connection the visit of the students of Agram to Servia in April, 1912, may be recalled. This event took on the aspect of a strongly suggestive demonstration, by reason of an official military reception and a review of Servian troops in honor of the students. Not without justification in fact did the report of the business manager of the Sokol Society at Kragujevac refer to this event "as the beginning and germ of a great deed which shall be performed in the nearest future," as "a seed which will put forth shoots when the soul of the people shall have been warmed to the task until there shall be no barriers which cannot be torn down."

Only a short while ago the authorities of the Dual Monarchy were apprised of the fact that the Servian Sokol Societies effected a



secret union with corresponding organizations in the Monarchy, of which the exact character, pending investigation, is not yet clearly established. Tentative results of this investigation indicate, however, that herein has been traced one of the channels through which the Servian Sokols and their friends are instilling their subversive aims into the minds of beguiled and misled persons in the Monarchy.

This preliminary propaganda, affecting masses as a whole, is, however, entirely overshadowed by the "foreign service work" performed by the Narodna Odbrana and its friends in their man-to-man canvass. This is the ground where the most deplorable results of the movement are evidenced. Through its secret emissaries and trusted agents, the agitation has stirred up unthinking youths as well as adults. Thus, Milan Pribicevitch induced the former Honvéd officers, V.B., D.K., V.N. and V.K., the last named a lieutenant in the Croatian-Slavonian gendarmerie, to desert the army of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy under serious circumstances, and to flee to Servia. True it is that they have been disappointed in their hopes and some of them would gladly return to the country which they betrayed.

The agitation developed by Servia in the middle schools in Croatia and Bosnia is unfortunately too well known to require exemplification. It is probably not so well known, however, that those expelled from Croatian and Bosnian schools for gross breaches of discipline are welcomed with open arms in Servia, often subsidized by the State and educated as enemies of the Monarchy. Servia schools with their anti-Austro-Hungarian text-books and maps, and the large number of professors and teachers belonging to the Narodna Odbrana, lend themselves admirably to the training of these adepts. The following is a notable instance of this sort: In March, 1914, several pupils of the training college for elementary teachers in Pakrac (Croatia) had to be expelled on account of a strike. They went to Servia, where some of them immediately obtained appointments as teachers, while others were admitted to a training college for teachers. Affiliating with people hostile to the Monarchy, one of these expelled school strikers publicly declared that he and his friends, on the occasion of the visit to Bosnia of the heir apparent, would produce convincing proofs that Bosnia was a Servian land. It must seem at least strange that the Royal Servian District Prefect in Krajna issued Servian passports to three of these compromised students at the time of the visit of Archduke Francis Ferdinand to Bosnia, in which they were falsely designated as Servian subjects, although he could not have helped being aware of their Croatian citizenship. Provided with these passports, the three undergraduate teachers were able to enter, unrecognized, the territory of the Monarchy, where eventually they were identified and arrested.

These activities, however, do not exhaust the full scope of the "foreign" work of the Narodna Odbrana. For some time past the Imperial and Royal Government has had confidential information that military preparations were being made for the longed-for war against Austria-Hungary and that Servian emissaries in the Dual Monarchy were under orders to destroy means of transportation and communication, after the manner of guerilla fighters, and to kindle revolts and cause panics in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. (See Enclosure 7).

The criminal prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his confederates in the Common Pleas Court at Serajevo in 1913 for the crime of espionage (See Enclosure 6) has produced evidence confirming this confidential information.

As at the time of its establishment, the Narodna Odbrana still has on its programme the preparation of a warfare of bands, supplemented by the development of a system of espionage. To-day the so-called "reorganized programme" of the Narodna Odbrana is in truth of broader scope, including the organization of the so-called "war of extermination" against the Monarchy and the unfurling of the "old red flag of the Narodna Odbrana."

Here, it will be seen, an atmosphere of hatred, promoted openly and secretly against the Dual Monarchy, prevailed. Coupled with it was an irresponsible agitation, availing itself of any means in the struggle against Austria-Hungary and remorselessly advocating common murder as the most efficient weapon. It is evident that out of such conditions acts of terrorism would be born, even without the active co-operation of anti-Austro-Hungarian individuals from Servia.

On June 8th, 1912, Luka Jukitch fired a shot at M. von Cuvaj, the Royal Commissioner, which fatally injured Councillor von Hervoitch, who was seated next to him in the carriage. In his flight Jukitch shot down a police officer who was pursuing him, and wounded two others.

The views expressed by Jukitch at the public hearing of his case, were in full accord with the basic ideas and plans circulated by the Narodna Odbrana. Although Jukitch had been brooding over his murderous schemes for some time, these projects really matured when he joined the pilgrimage of students from Agram to Belgrade on April 18th, 1912. During the celebrations given in honor of the visitors, Jukitch came in close touch with various persons within the sphere of the Narodna Odbrana and he had political discussions with them. A few days later Jukitch was again in Belgrade, where a Servian Major handed him a bomb and another sympathizer a Browning pistol, with which he carried out his attempt at murder.

The bomb which was found in Agram had been, in the opinion of experts, manufactured for military purposes in an arsenal.

Jukitch's attempt was a matter of recent memory when Stefan Dojcitch, who came from the United States to Agram, made a murderous attack in Agram on August 18th, 1913, upon the Royal Commissioner, Baron Skerlec—*an act born of the "foreign" agitation carried on by the Narodna Odbrana and its confederates among the Southern-Slavs in America.*

The pamphlet, "*Natrag u staro ognjiste vase*," published in Chicago by the Serb, T. Dimitrijevitich, contains unbridled invectives against His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty and an appeal to the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy to leave America and return to Serbia for the impending "liberation." This publication shows a remarkable parallelism between the unrestrained propaganda carried on by Serbia in America and the agitation carried on by Serbia in the territories of the Dual Monarchy.

Hardly a year later Agram was again the scene of a murderous attempt of this kind, which happily failed. On May 20th, 1914, Jacob Schäfer attempted to kill the Banus, Baron Skerlec, in the Agram theatre, which attempt was frustrated at the last moment by a police officer. The ensuing investigation uncovered a plot, of which the soul was Rudolf Hercigonja. The depositions of Hercigonja and his five co-defendants made it plain that this plot also had originated in Serbia.

Having participated in an unsuccessful attempt to free the above-mentioned Jukitch, Hercigonja had fled to Serbia (October, 1912), where he and his accomplice, Marojan Jaksitch, associated constantly with "*Komitadjis*" and members of the Narodna Odbrana. As in so many other instances where premature dabbling in politics had driven youthful minds to frenzy, the result of this corrupting intercourse proved disastrous. Hercigonja brought home the dogma preached in Belgrade, that the Southern-Slav districts of Austria-Hungary must be detached from the Monarchy and united with the Kingdom of Serbia. In this connection he had acquired the notion from his associations in Serbia that this end could be attained solely by the perpetration of murderous plots against persons of high rank and leading statesmen of the Dual Monarchy.

Hercigonja sought to instill these ideas into the minds of his friends in Agram, some of whom he won over to his cause. In the foreground of his programme was an attempt upon the life of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne.

A few months previously, proceedings in connection with a propaganda of high treason had been instituted against Luka Aljinovitch. In the course of the investigation three witnesses had deposed that Aljinovitch had declared in their presence that in 1913 he had received 100 dinars from the Narodna Odbrana and a like sum from a secret association of students for purposes of agitation and especially for an attack upon Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

These incidents indicate how the criminal activities of the Narodna Odbrana and its sympathizers had lately converged upon the person of the Archduke and heir apparent to the throne.

All these disclosures point to the conclusion that the Narodna Odbrana and the anti-Austrian circles affiliated with it in Serbia, deemed that the time had come to translate their teachings into deeds.

It is noteworthy, however, that in these activities the Narodna Odbrana confined itself to furnishing the impulses for deeds of violence, and, when its seeds had sunk into fertile ground, to supplying the material means for their commission; but that it left the dangerous role of the "propaganda of deeds" solely to the misled youth of the Dual Monarchy, who had to bear the full burden of their sorry "heroism."

All the features of this method we find in the history of the origin of the deplorable murder plot of June 28, 1914 (See Enclosure 8). Princip and Grabez are types of the youth whose minds had been poisoned in school by the teaching of the Narodna Odbrana.

In Belgrade, associating with a circle of students nourished upon these ideas, Princip conceived schemes to assassinate Archduke Francis Ferdinand, against whom the hatred of all Servian elements antagonistic to the Dual Monarchy had turned under the impetus of his visit to the annexed provinces.

Princip was joined by Gabrinovitch, a member of the same circles, whose erratic radical-revolutionary views had developed, according to his own admissions, under the influence of his surroundings in Belgrade and through perusal of Servian papers. Thus Gabrinovitch also drifted into ways hostile to the Monarchy and adopted the theories of "the propaganda of deed." Thanks to his antecedent dispositions, Grabez also quickly succumbed to the influence of these surroundings, which he had entered later.

But, howsoever far the matter may have developed and howsoever firm the determination of the conspirators may have been to carry out the plot, it would never have materialized, had not other persons supplied the means for its accomplishment, as in the case of Jukitch. Princip and Gabrinovitch at their trial admitted that they had neither weapons nor money of their own.

It is interesting to note the quarters where the confederates tried to get their weapons. Milan Pribicevitch and Zivojin Dacitch, these two notorious leaders of the Narodna Odbrana, were the first whom they thought of as helpers in their hour of need, apparently because in the circle of would-be-murderers and plotters it had become a tradition to procure murderous weapons from those representatives of the Narodna Odbrana. The accidental circumstance that these two men were not in Belgrade at the critical time frustrated this plan; Princip and Gabrinovitch had no difficulty,

however, in finding other helpers in the person of Milan Ciganovitch, a former "Komitadji" and now an official of the Central Servian State Railway in Belgrade, another active member of the Narodna Odbrana who had made his first appearance in its history as the graduate of a school for the training of bands in Cuprija in 1909. (See Enclosure 5). Nor were they disappointed in Ciganovitch, who immediately gave them the required supplies.

Ciganovitch with his friend, the Servian Major Voja Tankositch, likewise a leader of the Narodna Odbrana and a former director of the school of bands in Cuprija (see Enclosure 5), became now the intellectual leaders and promoters of the plot which they seemed to approve with an indifference characteristic of the moral qualities of the whole movement aimed at the Dual Monarchy. They had only one doubt in the beginning, and that was whether the three conspirators had firmly made up their minds to risk the deed. This hesitation, however, was soon overcome by the suggestive co-operation of the two Servian officials. Tankositch secured four Brownings with ammunition, and money for traveling expenses; six hand grenades from the Servian army stores supplemented this equipment, which in kind and origin invites comparison with the conditions in the Jukitch case. To make certain the success of the plot, Tankositch ordered that the conspirators be instructed in marksmanship, which task Ciganovitch assumed with a success now realized but too well. Special anxiety was evinced by both Tankositch and Ciganovitch in insuring secrecy about the plot. They supplied cyanide of potassium, with instructions that the perpetrators commit suicide with it after they should have performed their task. This precaution was to the sole advantage of the instigators of the deed, as the preservation of the secret would eliminate even the small risks which they had to assume in the undertaking. Certain death to the victims of its wiles, and complete security for themselves—such is the usual usage of the Narodna Odbrana.

To render possible the carrying out of the murder scheme, bombs and weapons had to be smuggled into Bosnia. Ciganovitch again acted as the helper, minutely designating to the conspirators the road which they should follow and enlisting the co-operation of the Servian frontier authorities to pass them into Bosnia. The manner of the organization of this passage, which even Princip found "mysterious," leaves no doubt of the fact that this was a well prepared and often utilized road for the secret purposes of the Narodna Odbrana.

In a matter-of-fact way which indicates long-established habit, the frontier captains at Schabatz and Loznica placed their entire staffs and administration at the disposal of the authors of the scheme. This mysterious means of travel, with its elaborate system

of constantly changing guides, always ready on the spot, as if by magic, when they were needed, worked without a hitch. Without even inquiring into the object of this unusual trip of a few immature students, the Servian authorities, at the behest of the former "Komitadji" and subordinate railway employee, Ciganovitch, set the machinery of their offices running smoothly for the accomplishment of the task. There was, of course, no need of questions, as the instructions which they had received made it quite clear to them that another "mission" of the Narodna Odbrana was to be carried out. The sight of the arsenal of bombs and revolvers elicited merely a benevolently approving smile from Grbitch, the customs officer on duty, which goes to show that on this "road" the sight of such contraband was quite customary.

The Royal Servian Government has assumed a heavy load in allowing all this to happen. Pledged to neighborly and friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, it has permitted its press to disseminate hatred against the Dual Monarchy. It has permitted the establishment, upon its soil, of organizations designed to conduct a revolutionary campaign against a neighboring state, under the leadership of high military and civil officials, teachers and judges. It has not suppressed the activities of men holding high posts in the state administration, who poisoned the national conscience to an extent that has made common assassination appear to be a commendable weapon.

### (ENCLOSURE 1.)

#### Servian Press Comments.

(a) On the occasion of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty's 80th birthday, on August 18, 1910, the "Politika" published a large picture of Bogdan Zerajitch, who two months before this had attempted to murder Baron Varesanin, Governor of Bosnia. The accompanying article ran as follows: "Two months ago, on June 2nd, on the very day of the opening the Bosnian-Herzegovinian diet, a Servian youth, the student Bogdan Zerajitch, attempted to murder the Governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo, General Marian Varesanin. Zerajitch fired five shots at this renegade, who had assured his career in the famous uprising in Rakovica by shedding the blood of his own brethren. Owing to a peculiar accident, the attempt to kill him was unsuccessful. Thereupon brave Zerajitch, with the sixth and last bullet, blew his brains out and instantly fell dead.

"In Vienna they knew full well that Zerajitch had not been prompted to attempt this murder by reading Russian and revolutionary writings. He had done this as a noble scion of a people, which in this bloody manner desired to protest against foreign rule. For this reason they tried to hush up the whole matter as quickly as pos-

sible and—also against their habit—tried to avert a trial, which would have compromised the Austrian Government in Bosnia and Herzegovina even more. In Vienna, the desire was expressed that the memory of Zerajitch be blotted out and that significance be denied to his murderous attempt. It is this fear of Zerajitch dead and the ban placed on his name throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has exalted his memory among the people as that of a saint—today, on August 18th, perhaps more than ever. On this day we also light a candle on his grave and cry: ‘Honor to Zerajitch!’ ”

Here are appended some verses, which in rough translation run as follows:

“Bosnia lives, death not yet has come unto her;  
In vain her body have you entombed;  
A fettered victim, she still flashes her fire.  
Time is not yet to intone her dirge.  
With devilish hands you scratched upon the grave,  
Yet will the living dead not go down to rest.  
Emperor, harkst Thou? In the flash of the gun  
Those bullets of lead how they whiz by Thy Throne?  
Not slaves they; no, ’tis freedom divine  
Shining forth from the brave hand of the conquered.  
Why quaketh thus that terrible Golgotha?  
In defense of Christ, Peter drew his sword.  
His hand fell, but from his blood  
A thousand more brave hands will rise;  
Yon shot was but the first messenger  
Of the Servian Easter that shall follow Golgotha’s pain.”

(b) On October 8, 1910, on the anniversary of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the “Politika” and “Mali Journal,” the latter with black borders, published violent attacks upon Austria-Hungary.

“Europe must take note that the Servian people still thirst for revenge.” “The day of revenge must arrive; the feverish efforts of Serbia to organize her army are a token of this accounting to come, as is the hatred of the Servian people for the neighboring Monarchy.”

Such were some of the expressions used by these journals.

On the same occasion the “Samouprava” on October 9, 1910, said: “Invective and excesses are not the effective expression of genuine patriotism. It is solely through calm and dignified work that the goal can be reached.”

(c) On April 18, 1911, the “Politika” wrote: “With the exception of a few cynics nobody in Servia would look with favor upon

a visit of King Peter to Vienna or Budapest. The annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has once for all shattered even the semblance of friendship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary. This every Serbian feels."

(d) The "Belgradske Novine" on April 18, 1911, wrote as follows: "Most of the men close to the Government disapprove King Peter's projected visit to Emperor Francis Joseph. The storm of indignation which stirred all Serbians because of this proposed trip of the King, is quite natural."

(e) The "Mali Journal" of April 19, 1911, has this to say: "King Peter's visit to the Sovereign of Austria-Hungary would mean an insult to all Serbia. Through this visit Serbia would lose her claim to Piémont's part. Serbia's interests can never be identified with Austria's interests."

(f) On April 23, 1911, the "Politika," "Mali Journal," "Tribuna," "Belgradske Novine" and "Vecernje Novosti" thus comment on the proposed visit of King Peter to the court of Vienna: "Between Serbia and Austria-Hungary there never can be friendship. King Peter's proposed visit means, therefore, 'an infamous capitulation,' 'a humiliation to Serbia,' 'a solemn sanction of all the crimes and misdeeds committed by Austria-Hungary against Serbia and the Serbian people.'"

(g) On April 18, 1912, the "Trgovinski Glasnik" publishes an editorial entitled "Austria's Collapse," which reads in part: "In Austria-Hungary there is ruin in every direction. What is happening beyond the Danube and Save is no longer a German, Magyar, Bohemian or Croatian crisis, but a general Austrian crisis, a crisis of the dynasty itself. We Serbians view with satisfaction such a course of affairs in Austria."

(h) In an article entitled "The Frontiers of Albania" the "Balkan" attacks Austria-Hungary as follows: "If Europe is too weak to call a halt on Austria, Montenegro and Serbia will do so by shouting to Austria: 'Stop; you shall go no further.' War between Austria-Hungary and Serbia is inevitable. We have dismembered the Turkish Empire; we shall likewise rend Austria asunder. We have ended one war; now we are facing another."

(i) The "Vecernje Novosti," April 22, 1913, publishes a plea to the travelling Serbian public and Serbian business men to boycott the Danube steamship company. It says: "Nobody should travel on the ships of this Austrian company, nor should anybody transport cargo on them. Whoever does this, should be fined by a committee. The fines would go into the fund of the Komitadjis, which is to be utilized in the coming war with Austria."



(k) The "Tribuna," May 26, 1914, on the occasion of Austria-Hungary's occupation of Ada Kaleh, publishes the following: "Criminal black-and-yellow Austria has again played a burglar's trick. She is a thief, who, if she cannot steal a whole bag of money, contents herself with one dinar."

(l) On June 10, 1913, on the anniversary of the attempted murder of the Royal Commissioner in Agram by the student Luka Jukitch, Servian papers published commemorative articles. Says the "Pravda" in one article: "It must hurt the soul to its depths that not everybody has acted as our Jukitch did. We have Jukitch no more, but we have hatred and anger; we have to-day ten millions of Jukitch. We are firmly convinced that Jukitch, through the window of his prison, will soon hear freedom's last gunshot."

(m) "Mali Journal," October 7, 1913, published an editorial, wherein the right of existence is denied to Austria-Hungary and all Slavic nationalities are called upon to second the offensive war, which Serbia planned to start soon.

(n) The "Piémont," October 8, 1913, has this to say on the anniversary of the annexation: "To-day five years have elapsed since an Imperial decree extended the sceptre of the Habsburgs over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people of Servia will feel the pain inflicted upon them on this date for many another decade. Humiliated and bereft, the Servian people moaned in despair. The nation made vows to wreak vengeance and to win freedom by heroic measures. This day has come again to rouse the slackened energies of the race. To-day, Servian graves dot the ancient Servian countries; Servian cavalry is treading on the battlefields of Macedonia and Old-Servia. The people of Servia, having finished their task in the South, now turn in the opposite direction, whence the moans and anguish of the Servian brother come to them, and where the gibbet is set up. Servian soldiers, to-day, fighting these Albanians, stirred up in Dusan's Empire by the State which took Bosnia and Herzegovina from us, have vowed that they will proceed in a similar way against the 'Second Turkey,' as they have dealt by God's help with the Turkey of the Balkans. They take this pledge, confident that the day of vengeance is approaching. One Turkey has disappeared. The good God of Servia will grant that the 'Second Turkey' shall also disappear."

(o) The "Mali Journal" of November 4, 1913, publishes this: "Any thought of a reconciliation with Austria-Hungary is equivalent to treason against the people of Servia. Servia must reckon with the facts and forever bear in mind that Austria-Hungary is her dangerous enemy and that to fight that monarchy must be the most sacred duty of every Servian Government."

(p) Thus the "Pravda" of January 14, 1914: "Our new year's wishes go first to our not yet liberated brothers, groaning under an alien yoke. Servians may well persevere; after Kossovo came Kumanovo, and our victorious march is not yet ended."

(q) The "Novosti" of January 18, 1914, published a picture of the religious ceremony of the blessing of the waters in Bosnia, in connection with the following text: "Servians maintain their customs without modification even in lands which groan under foreign rule, until the day of freedom shall find them united in enthusiasm."

(r) The "Zastava" in the issue of January, 1914, admits that "Servia incites the Austro-Hungarian Serbs to revolution."

(s) The "Mali Journal" of March 9, 1914, has this to say: Serbia can never forget the rattling of Francis Ferdinand's sabre on the occasion of the Scutari affair."

(t) The "Zastava," April 4, 1914, publishes this: "The Austrian statesmen who promote a policy of hatred, a policy of bureaucrats, not a far-reaching policy, are themselves bringing about the ruin of their state."

(u) The "Pravda" of April 8, 1914, makes the following comment: "Austria has lost all rights to existence."

(v) In the Easter issues (April, 1914), all Serbian papers express hope that their "unliberated, conquered and oppressed brethren may soon celebrate a glad resurrection."

(w) The "Tribuna" of April 23, 1914, says: "The Pacifists have discovered a new slogan: that of 'Europe's patriotism.' This programme can be carried out only if Austria is divided."

(x) The "Mali Journal" of May 12, 1914, says: "What is a crime in private life Austria calls politics. History knows only one monster, and that monster is Austria."

#### (ENCLOSURE 2.)

Extract from the "Narodna Odbrana," the official organ of the Society of the same name, published by the Central Committee of that Society. (Narodna Odbrana, izdanje stredisnog odbora Narodna Odbrane. Beograd, 1911. Nova stamparija "Davidovic," Decanska ulica br. 14. Ljub. Davidovica.)

In a brief preface to this pamphlet it is pointed out that the publication "does not represent a complete, exhaustive analysis of the total general work of the Narodna Odbrana, as for many reasons it neither should nor could do that."

This publication is divided into three parts, the first of which consists of fourteen Chapters setting forth a sort of programme, while the second contains a report on the activity of the society and the third consists of sample rules for the organization of similar societies beyond the frontiers of Servia.

In Chapter 1, entitled "Genesis and Activity of the first Narodna Odbrana," it is pointed out that this society was the outcome of the popular movement which swept over Serbia after the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and had the following object:

- (1.) To arouse, encourage and strengthen national sentiment.
- (2.) To enroll and recruit volunteers.
- (3.) To form volunteer-units and prepare them for armed action.
- (4.) To collect voluntary contributions in money and supplies for the realization of the task.
- (5.) To organize, equip and drill special irregular troops ("committees") for special, independent warfare.
- (6.) To institute movements in all other ways for the defense of the Servian people.

In connection with the above, it is pointed out that on account of the recognition by the Great Powers of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a stop was put to the work of the society, whereupon under the by-laws the programme of the Odbrana was reorganized and a new work was started in order that the "old, red war-flag of the Narodna Odbrana might again be unfurled" if a similar situation should arise.

In Chapter II., entitled "The New Narodna Odbrana of To-day," is the following passage:

"Experience taught us in the days of the annexation that Serbia was not prepared for the struggle which circumstances imposed upon her. The struggle which Serbia has to assume is more serious and difficult than was thought. The annexation was merely one of the blows dealt to this country by the enemies of Serbia. It was a blow preceded by many other blows, which will be followed by still others. In order that a new surprise attack may not find Serbia in an equally unprepared state, it is necessary to prepare ourselves for work."

The preparation of the people for a forward movement in all directions of national work in conformity with the requirements of modern times, is set down as the object of this "work" in which the mass of the people must take part. As a means to attain this end, a strengthening of national consciousness, athletic sports, economic and hygienic welfare, the raising of the level of culture, etc., are conspicuously enjoined upon the individual and upon the society, next to the state itself.

In Chapter III., "The Three Chief Problems," it is declared that the annexation taught that the national consciousness in Serbia was not so strong as it should be in a country which, with a population of less than three millions, constituted the hope and mainstay of seven millions of the subjugated Serb people. The first problem of the society was, therefore, to strengthen the national consciousness. The second problem was the promotion of physical training; the third was to accomplish the goal of proper valuation of these sporting activities.

In the fourth chapter, "About Shooting," the value of a good training in marksmanship, especially for the Servian contingents, is emphasized, inasmuch as there the military training lasts only six months. These remarks conclude with the sentence:

"A new blow like the annexation must be met by a new Servian people, in which every Serb, from childhood to old age, must be a sharpshooter."

Chapter V., which treats of "The Relation of the Narodna Odbrana to the Sokol Societies," begins with a general discussion of the conditions for the strength of States in culture and political life. In this connection the decline of Turkey is pointed out, and it is added:

"The old Turks of the South are disappearing little by little, and only a part of our people still suffer under their rule. But new Turks come from the North, more terrible and more dangerous than the old. Stronger in culture and economically, the northern enemies attack us. They wish to deprive us of our freedom, to suppress our language, to crush us. The preliminary symptoms of the approaching struggle are perceptible. The Servian people face the question, 'To be or not to be.'"

"What Do We Desire in the Lectures?" is the heading of chapter VII., the gist of which is summed up in the sentences:

"The Narodna Odbrana instituted lectures which were more or less lectures of agitation. The programme of our new work was developed. At every lecture the annexation was spoken about, the old Narodna Odbrana and the tasks of the new. The lectures will never cease to be lectures of agitation, but they will always develop more and more into individual channels and concern themselves with every question of our social and national life."

Chapter VIII., "Woman's activity in the Narodna Odbrana," IX., "Work with reference to details and secondary matters" and X., "Renaissance of the Association," while referring to the task of the Narodna Odbrana, deal with the preparation and intensification of the association's activity, and with the necessity of regenerating individuals, the nation and the state.

Chapter XI., "New Obilitch\* and Singjelitch," says by way of introduction:

"It is a mistake to assert that Kossovo is a thing of the past. We are in the midst of Kossovo. Our Kossovo to-day is the darkness and ignorance in which our people live. The other reasons for the new

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\*Note.—Milos Obilitch (also Kobilitch), Servian tradition tells, crept into the Turkish camp after the battle of Kossovopolie, or Kossovo, and murdered Sultan Murad, (cf. von Kallay, "History of the Serbs," Vol. I.)

Stephan Singjelitch, Knez of Resara, played a part in the Servian revolt of 1807-1810. In 1809 Singjelitch defended the redoubt of Tschagar against the Turks, and it is said that when he realized he was no match for the superior forces opposed to him numerically, he blew up his position and part of his men, together with many Turks, (von Kallay, "The History of the Servian Revolt.")

Kosovo exist on our borders at the north and west: The Germans, Austrians, and Swabians, (Schwabas), with their encroachment upon our Slav and Serb South."

The heroic deeds of Obilitch and Singjelitch are pointed out, and the necessity of self-sacrifice in the service of the nation, and it is added: "The national cause involves sacrifices, namely, in Turkey and Austria, where such workers are persecuted by the authorities, thrown into prison, and brought to the gallows. For this battle against darkness and ignorance, too, such heroes are needed. The Narodna Odbrana does not doubt that in the battle with rifles and cannon against the Schwabas and our other enemies our people will furnish a host of heroes. But the Narodna Odbrana is not satisfied with that, for it regards the present so-called peaceful relations as a state of war, and calls for heroes likewise for this struggle which we are waging in Serbia and beyond the border."

Chapter XII. is headed "The Union With the Brothers and Friends," and its significance is suggested by the following sentences:

"Among the main problems of the Narodna Odbrana is that of maintaining the union with our near and distant brothers beyond the border and the rest of our friends in the world. By the word 'people' the Narodna Odbrana is meant our entire race, not only those in Serbia. It hopes that the work done by it in Serbia will spur the brothers outside of Serbia to more active participation in the work of private initiative, in order that the new upward movement to-day for the creation of a powerful Servian Narodna Odbrana shall proceed in common in all Serb territories."

In chapter XIII., which is headed "Two Important Problems," occurs the following:

"Inasmuch as we take the ground that through the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina the encroachment upon our territories from the north has been fully revealed, the Narodna Odbrana regards Austria-Hungary as our greatest enemy." This work (namely, to designate Austria to the Servian people as its greatest enemy) is regarded by the society as a vitally necessary task, as its fundamental duty. Then the book continues:

"As once upon a time the Turks poured in upon us from the south, so Austria-Hungary to-day is attacking us from the north. If the Narodna Odbrana preaches the necessity of a war against Austria-Hungary, it is preaching a holy truth of our national situation."

The hatred arising as a result of this propaganda, it is pointed out, is not to be regarded as the goal, but as a natural phase of the work whose purpose is independence and freedom. If hereby hatred against Austria is engendered, it is Austria who sowed it through its course, a course which "makes necessary the war against Austria until that monarchy is exterminated."

The modern conception of the national idea is extolled, and it is remarked that in talking about "deliverance and union" too much work is done with phrases. The people must be told:

"The liberation of our alienated Serb territories and their union with Servia is necessary for our gentlemen, our merchants, our farmers; for the most fundamental requirements of culture and trade, for space and for bread. Recognizing this, the people will lay a hand to the national work with a will and great self-sacrifice. Our people must be told that the freedom of Bosnia is necessary for the latter, not only out of pity for the brothers there suffering, but also for the sake of trade and for an outlet to the sea."

The "two tasks" of the Narodna Odbrana are then summed up in the following closing sentences: "Besides the task of explaining to the people the danger threatening it from Austria, the Narodna Odbrana has the more important task of carrying home to the people, with complete preservation of the holy national memories, this new healthy conception, so mighty in its results, of nationalism and of work for freedom and union."

Chapter XIV., the concluding division, opens with an appeal to the Government and the people of Servia to prepare with all means for the conflict "which the annexation foreshadowed."

In these passages the activities of the Narodna Odbrana are once more recapitulated:

"Since the Narodna Odbrana works in accordance with the spirit of the time and in conformity with the altered circumstances, maintaining at the same time all connections that were formed at the time of the annexation, it is the same to-day as it was then. It is to-day Odbrana (defense); it is also to-day Narodna (of the people). To-day, too, it rallies to its banners the citizens of Servia as it did at the time of the annexation. At that time the cry was for war; to-day the cry is for work; at that time meetings, demonstrations, volunteer committees, rifles, and bombs were called for; to-day silent, fanatical, indefatigable work is required, and more work in the direction of the tasks and duties which we have indicated, as temporary preparation for the battle with rifle and cannon that will come."

On the subject of the organization of the Narodna Odbrana, this annual report of the society contains the following:

A central Committee with its seat at Belgrade conducts all the minutes of the Narodna Odbrana. All other committees of the Narodna Odbrana are subordinate to this. The Central Committee is divided into four sections: for educational work, for physical training, for financial collection, and for foreign affairs.

District committees, whose headquarters are at places where there are political authorities, direct the affairs of the respective districts.

Town societies are the directing organizations in the individual towns.

Trusted men are to be found in those places within the country where there is no need of forming a committee.

Societies which "stand in closest relations with the work of the organization of the Narodna Odbrana" and are supported by the latter are: the Sharpshooters' Union, with 762 societies; the Sokol Union, "Dusan Silni," with 2,500 members; the Olympic Club, the Riding Society, "Knez Mihaljo"; the Hunters' Union and the Culture League.

All these societies are similarly organized as the Narodna Odbrana, utilize the quarters of the latter, namely, society houses, libraries, etc.; prominent members of these societies are chairmen of committees of the Narodna Odbrana.

### (ENCLOSURE 3.)

Extract from the "Report of the Activities of the Sokol Society Dusan Silni in Kragujevac in the Years 1912 and 1913." (Kragujevac, "Buducnost" Press, Tih. Lekitch, 1914.)

At the head of this report appears the address with which the President of the society, the Royal Serbian Major Kovacevitch, greeted the annual meeting in January, 1914:

"It is known to you that the Sokol institution, born in the battle against Germanism, is a purely Slavic institution, which pursues the aim of uniting all Slav brothers, to inspire them with enthusiasm and through education and force to prepare for the battle against the foe of Slavdom.

"We Serbs, as a part of the great Slav community, have adopted the Sokol idea and joined hands in the common work for our own welfare and that of our brothers.

"We Serbs, too, will live and work in the spirit of the Sokol, for we wish to revive the weary and exhausted, to strengthen the weak and anxious, to free the captives and the enchained. We have done this both at present and in former wars. We have delivered a part of our brothers from the arrogance of the enemy in the south. We have torn away their chains, have freed them from pain, and have given them freedom so that in it they may enjoy happiness, equality, and fraternity."

After some words of praise of this "noble work" which "realized a part of the great Sokol idea," Major Kovacevitch continued:

"But, my brothers and sisters, our enemy in the north is more dangerous and heartless because economically and culturally he is stronger.

"This enemy is insatiable in his lust; he holds millions of our brothers in chains and slavery. He deprived them of freedom and law, and subjugated them to his service. The brothers cry and beg for speedy help.

"We may not abandon them to the mercy of this terrible and devouring foe. Rather must we hasten to their assistance, because to do that is our duty. Could we, in the last analysis, be happy if so many of our brothers live, suffer, and complain in slavery?"

"Brothers and sisters!"

"The foe is dangerous, lustful, and vicious. Let us always be on our guard.

"Let us work with greater eagerness and self-sacrifice. Let us be faithful in our holy Sokol duty, true and persevering.

"Let us prepare for the struggle and for the support of the just Sokol idea.

"Let us unite with the numberless swarms of Sokols and let us always think of that truth which the Servian Sokolists have inscribed on their banner: That only a healthy, strong, nationally conscious, and well-organized people is fit to defend itself, to give battle, to conquer."

To this address of the President is appended the report of the Executive Committee. After summarizing the results achieved in the last wars, which hampered the society in its activities for two years, it points out: "The day has come on which we return to our work because our programme is not yet fulfilled and our task not yet completed. A large part of our people still endure the suffering of the Crucified Christ; we must still visit our brothers beyond the Drina; we must still seek the City of Serajevo and the heritage of the holy Sava; we must see to the homeland of Marina Novak, of Deli Radivoj, and the old Vujadin; we must cross the hills of Romanija and see why Travnik has wrapped himself in mist; some day that song must cease. Woe, Bosnia, thou orphan before God, hast thou nowhere people of thy tribe?"

After a discussion of the various undertakings of the society, emphasis is laid on the fact that the society maintains relations with "the brother societies beyond the Save and Drina," and special emphasis is laid on the sending of delegates to the celebration of the Prosvjeta at Serajevo. In this connection the report says: "By sending these delegates to the brothers in Bosnia the committee intended to say to them: 'We have not forgotten you. The wings of the falcon of Sumadija are still mighty.'"

After a detailed account of a visit of Agram students to Servia and the consecration of the flag of the "Society of the Sober Youth" the report of the Executive Committee ends with these sentences:

"The administration knows how properly to value these phenomena—the arrival of the brother Croats in the Sumadija and the convening of the 'Sober Youth' from all districts in Serbdom, and it will be no exaggeration to say that these events signify the beginning and germ of a great deed that will be enacted in the very near future.



"They are the expression of a great, and until now silent, awakening of the national consciousness and strength of a down-trodden race, which is not permitted to arise and unite. Only a while longer and this germ will ripen, and when the popular soul expands still more there will be no restrictions that it cannot tear to pieces, no obstacles in its path which it will not be able to overcome. The work of strengthening this power, the co-operation in and hastening of the course of this national development, the development and support of this idea, was always the goal of the administration's actions."

The report of the Treasurer in the first place names all those who liberally supported the society: the District Committee of the Narodna Odbrana in Kragujevac, especially its cavalry section, which frequently has come to the assistance of the Sokol Society with precious help; the Director of the gymnasium at Kragujevac, who always "showed his active paternal interest" in the Sokols; the Divisional Commandant of the Sumadija, who liberally supported the society; the President of the District Court in Kragujevac, the district chief, and the community leader in Kragujevac.

After the Treasurer has memorialized the members of the society who had been killed in the war he concludes his report with the following words:

"After such a brilliant victory over a part of our enemy the society's leaders hope that all of you from now on will devote yourselves even more fully and joyfully to the activities of the Sokol institution, so that in our falcon aerie you may train falcons which at a given time will be able to soar aloft and on their mighty pinions bring to all our unliberated brothers fraternity, love, and freedom."

The annual report is signed by Major M. J. Kovacevitch as President, by the Court Secretary, D. V. Brzakovitch, as Secretary, and by ten members of the board, among whom are two Professors, (Emil Lukitch and Milan Jankovitch), as well as one other officer, (Infantry Major Michael Vasitch).

From this annual report and from a table sent out by the Kragujevac Sokol Society to the "Srpski Sokol" in Tuzla for filling out, and likewise signed by Major Kovacevitch and Court Secretary Brzakovitch, it appears that the Sokol societies in Servia were linked with organizations of the same kind in the Monarchy in closer relations than had heretofore been the case.

## (ENCLOSURE 4.)

**The Servian Official Gazette in the Service of the Narodna Odbrana.**

The Servian official gazette, "Srpski Novine," of June 28, 1914, contained as a supplement an appeal to the Narodna Odbrana which was furnished to all subscribers to the gazette. This appeal contained the following passages:

"Brothers and Sisters: Only a part of Kossovo has been avenged, only a part of St. Vitus Day atoned for. Throughout the lands in which our popular tongue is heard—the Servian, Croatian, and Slavonic—from Kikinda to Monastir, from Trieste to Carevo-Selo, extends the significance of St. Vitus Day and of Kossovo. As many national souls still weep upon this territory, as many chains still press our brothers, as much work is still to be accomplished, and as much must we still sacrifice. St. Vitus Day might formerly have denoted a day of mourning for us, but to-day, when we have gone far into our new history, when back of us stand great and glorious national events, and still greater and more glorious ones still await us, to-day when we are in the midst of the creation of the great national State, St. Vitus Day must be for us a day of great rejoicing and pride for what has taken place, since it sprung from that day, and still more because of what is to come. Servian men and Servian women! Millions of our brothers, Slavonians, Croatians, and Serbs, outside of our borders look upon us to-day, the children of the kingdom, and their breasts swell with hope and joy as they look upon our majestic manifestations of to-day for the national cause.

"God helps the brave! Forward all! That part of our holy task that has not yet been accomplished summons us, that part which is still to be accomplished. St. Vitus Day, 1914, in Belgrade."

## (ENCLOSURE 5.)

**Testimony of Trifko Krstanovitch about the Narodna Odbrana.**

Trifko Krstanovitch, a journeyman baker of Zavidovitchi, was arrested on the night of July 6-7, 1914, because by a remark made by him shortly after the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand to the effect that this assassination was to have been expected, he had rendered himself suspicious of having had advance knowledge of the conspiracy.

He was, therefore, brought the district court at Serajevo. In the examination of the prisoner it developed that the suspicion against him was not justified by the remark he had made, inasmuch as the remark was based solely on his former knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana and had merely been an expression of his opinion that in the agitation in Servia against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and especially against Archduke Francis Ferdinand, such an act was to have been expected. The prosecution

of Krstanovic was, therefore, dropped for lack of evidence, and the prisoner was examined as a witness with a view to his knowledge of the activities of the Narodna Odbrana, which was considered important for the purposes of the investigation.

The following extract from his sworn testimony on July 19, 1914, is of pertinent interest:

"In the Autumn of the year 1908 I crossed the border to Serbia on the Mokra Gora at Visegrad, in search of employment. I went to Bajina Basta in the Uzice district, and as I found no employment there I went to Belgrade, where I arrived at the time of the announcement of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Inasmuch as I saw that on account of the annexation great excitement and commotion had been aroused among the populace and that I would be unable to find any sort of employment, I entered the Imperial and Royal Consulate in order to be helped home. But as I left the Consulate a gendarme grabbed me on the street and asked me where I came from. Thinking me to be a spy, he took me to a police station. Here I was questioned, and when I told them that I would like to go home a subaltern officer began to abuse me, asking why I wanted to leave Serbia at this time, when they needed men more than ever because there might be a war with Austria. When I told him that I had nothing to live on, he replied that I would get all I needed if I would enroll with the committee. In my distress I agreed, and a gendarme led me into the Hotel Zelenou Vijencu (The Green Garland) and there introduced me to Voja Tankositch, the leader of the committee and a Captain in the regular army. Here I received board and lodging, and, as I saw, others of the committee lived here.

"Voja Tankositch told me it was the purpose of the committee to give training in bomb throwing, in the destruction of bridges, tunnels, telegraph and railway lines, because things might easily lead up to a war between Austria and Serbia. Thereupon a man led me into a house of smaller area adjoining the Ministry of Finance, where the offices of the committee were, and here in the office I met Milan Pribicevitch, who registered me in the committee. At this registration Milan Pribicevitch asked me if Voja Tankositch had told me what my duties as a committeeman would be, and I answered 'Yes.' He told me that the men who had been registered must be efficient, strong, and ready to make sacrifices. At that time we had been registered to the number of about seventy. We did nothing in Belgrade.

"After about a month and a half our leader, Tankositch informed us that the Great Powers had ordered the dissolution of our committee and that we must leave Belgrade and hide in some out-of-the-way place. They sent us to the town of Cuprija. Here we were trained by the officers Voja Tankositch, Dusan Putnik, Zivko

Gvozditch, and Mitar Djinovitch, who was involved in the Montenegrin bomb affair and who was shot in Montenegro. We were forbidden to associate with the people of the place, so that nothing might be disclosed about our objects and our numbers. We practiced throwing bombs, laying mines, and destroying telephone and railroad lines, tunnels and bridges. Every fortnight we were visited by Milan Pribicevitch, Gen. Bozo Jankovitch, and the apothecary Skaritch, the delegate Zivko Rafajlovitch, a certain Glisitch Milutin, an official in the Ministry of Finance, and these watched as we practiced and each time paid the expenses of our keep. Our teachers told us that as soon as war should be declared we committees would go forward in advance, behind us the volunteers, and then the regular army.

"In Cuprija we were about 140 men. In addition to board, lodging, and clothes, each of us received 25 para a day for tobacco. The course lasted about three months—that is, until March, 1909. Then the members of the committee told us that we were dismissed and that we must disperse, for the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been recognized by the Great Powers, and our committee, therefore, had no further purpose. Upon the dissolution of the committee Gen. Bozo Jankovitch told me that I would enter into the service of Bozo Milanovic in Sabac and get 50 dinar a month. He did not tell me what sort of service that would be. I accepted, because I felt myself as a committeeman to be in duty bound to obey Gen. Jankovitch, and also because I had nothing to live on. Thus in March, 1909, I arrived at Sabac and announced myself to Bozo Milanovitch a merchant in Sabac.

"Gen. Jankovitch had told me that Bozo Milanovitch was the leader of the Narodna Odbrana in Sabac and that I would serve under him in this Narodna Odbrana. When I gave Bozo Milanovitch the General's letter and he had read it, he told me that I must serve him faithfully and carry out instructions. My chief duty would be to carry his letters wherever they were addressed. In case I should not carry a letter to the place to which it was addressed, and in case any one else got in possession of this letter, my life would be involved. The very next day Bozo Milanovitch gave me a sealed letter which I was to carry to Cedo Lukitch, Guardian of the Treasury in Servian Raca. On the way toward Raca in the village of Bojatitch I was halted by the District Captain, who took my letter, opened it, and read it. In the letter Lukitch was instructed to buy three boats immediately, so that they might be ready in case they were needed. Enclosed in the letter were 100 dinar. On this occasion the Captain told me that strict orders had been given by the Ministry that the komitadjis should do nothing on their own initiative, so that no international diplomatic intervention might be provoked. I returned to

Sabac and reported to Bozo Milanovitch what had happened. Bozo Milanovitch turned to the District Prefect, and the latter gave orders that the revolver which the Captain in Bojatic had taken from me should be returned to me. He also ordered the Captain to expedite the letter to the Cedo Lukitch to whom it was addressed. From March, 1909, to October, 1910, I carried forty-three such letters to Servian Raca, fifty-five to Loznica, five to Zvornik, two to Ljubivija, and I know not how many to Koviljaca. I noted how many times I was in each place because these places were very far from Sabac.

"I carried the letters to the Directors of the customs offices in the respective places, and from these I received other letters in reply, which I carried to Bozo Milanovitch. I remember that I also carried letters several times to Sepacka Ada. My assistant in carrying letters was a certain Vaso Eritch, a native of Srebrenica. I carried letters every week to Belgrade from Bozo Milanovitch and delivered them to Milan Pribicevitch and Bozo Jankovitch. I knew nothing of the contents of these letters, and no one told me anything about these. So far as I could see the letters which Bozo Milanovitch sent were not in cipher, while the letters which the Directors of the customs offices sent were written with peculiar signs, which I noticed when Bozo Milanovitch opened them. Once I brought to Bozo Milanovitch such a letter in cipher, I think from Zvornik, and he sent me with the note to Mika Atanasijevitch, Professor in Sabac, so that the latter might decipher it. The latter did so, as he usually did. But he forgot to seal the translation, so I read it. In this letter was written that it was reported from reliable sources that money was to be coined with the portrait of the Heir Apparent, and that this was an indication that the Emperor Francis Joseph would abdicate. After about eight months of my service with Bozo Milanovitch, Bozo gave me a visiting card on which a skull had been drawn and on which was written that I had been appointed a trusted man (Povjerenik) of the Narodna Odbrana. On this occasion he told me that it was a matter of espionage.

"Once I learned from the officer Dusan Opterkitch, a member of the Narodna Odbrana, that the Narodna Odbrana in Bosnia and Herzegovina had twenty-three members. Otherwise, however, I do not know whether the Narodna Odbrana has any organization in Bosnia, or what kind of organization it is. From time to time Milan Pribicevitch gave me a revolver, or sometimes money to buy a revolver, so that I might give it to the revenue men on the border who served as komitadjis, since they had no revolvers and no money to buy them. As it seemed to me, Milan Pribicevitch gave them these as a token of honor for being komitadjis. I had no other business with weapons.

"Once I was assigned by Bozo Milanovitch to accompany a man to a farm in Lijesnica, on the Drina, and was told that the farmer would give us information and show us everything necessary so that we two might kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, a Servian reserve officer who had fled to Bijeljina. The committee of the Narodna Odbrana had, it seems, discovered that Ljubo Stanaricitch was dangerous for the Servian State and had condemned him to death.

"From Bozo Milanovitch I and that other man received instructions to cross the Drina at a certain place and to kill Ljubo Stanaricitch, who lives in the bank of the Drina on the Bosnian side, in the Bijeljiner District. I and the other man started to ford the Drina, but because the water was deep, and also because we saw that Ljubo was walking around his house with his gun on his shoulder, we returned to the farmer. Because I saw that we could not kill him with a knife, I sent my companion to Sabac to inform Bozo Milanovitch that it was impossible to kill Stanaricitch in the manner in which he desired, namely, with the knife. Thereupon I received instructions from Bozo Milanovitch to kill him any way. Then we decided to shoot him with the rifle. The man who was with me was instructed by Bozo to shoot at Stanaricitch and kill him, and I was to make sure that this was carried out. In the meantime, however, a mounted gendarme came, bringing instructions from the District Prefect in Sabac that we were to return and give up our original task. And so we returned to Sabac.

"In October, 1910, I asked Bozo Milanovitch to increase my pay, and when he was unwilling to do that I told him that I would no longer remain in his service. From Sabac I went to Belgrade, where I met Gen. Jankovitch, who had me arrested because I had refused obedience. They dragged me through various prisons for about two months, and all because I had given notice that I would quit obeying commands and they were afraid I would betray their secrets. Finally the authorities decided to send me back to Bosnia. In Sabac a prisoner told me that my life was in danger. The gendarmes accompanied me to Zvornik, where they turned me over to the Bosnian gendarmes. Thus I arrived in December, 1910, in Bosnia.

"I know nothing definite about any Black Hand except what I read about that Hand in Servian newspapers. I do not remember to-day what was written about that Black Hand in the newspapers. Likewise, I know nothing about the Black List. In Servia after the annexation there was a general resentment and hatred against the person of the Austro-Hungarian Heir Apparent, for he was generally looked upon as a blood foe of the Serbs."

Krstanovitch also called attention to previous statements by him, of which only the following are of interest as supplementing the above declaration:

The committee in which Krstanovitch was enrolled through Milan Pribicevitch was created by the Narodna Odbrana. In the school in Cuprija there were twenty-two members from the Monarchy. Among the pupils was also Milan Ciganovitch.

In the school at Cuprija it was taught that the committee must be ready to go to Bosnia at the order of the Narodna Odbrana and there to act under instructions to be received from their superiors.

### (ENCLOSURE 6.)

#### **Extract from the Documents of the District Court in Serajevo in the Prosecution of Jovo Jaglicitch and his Accomplices for the Crime of Espionage.**

In the year 1913 a system of espionage carried on by Jovo Jaglicitch and several accomplices in Bosnia in favor of Serbia was discovered. The criminal prosecution, which was begun in Serajevo, brought out, among other things, the following facts, affording a glimpse into the methods of the Greater Servian propaganda and especially of the Narodna Odbrana.

Jovo Jaglicitch stated that in the month of August or September, 1912, he met for the first time the former Cattle Inspector in Foca, Petar Klaritch, called Pesut, who in the Autumn of 1912 fled to Montenegro and then became a "komitadji."

At their first meeting Klaritch asked Jaglicitch whether he knew Rade Milosevitch of Kalinovik, and upon his answer that Milosevitch was dangerously ill in the hospital, said: "It's a pity if he dies. We have been talking of wonderful things. Has he not told you anything about it?" Upon his replying in the negative, Klaritch said: "I would like to tell you something important. We are Serbs and must do something important for Serbia; come to my office." There then took place between them the following conversation:

"Jovan, I will tell you something; I do not yet know you or whether you will betray me. I tell it to you, nevertheless, and if you have the heart to do so betray me!"

Upon inquiry by Jaglicitch as to what it was all about, Klaritch answered: "Brother, in Serbia there is a society, the Narodna Odbrana. Many persons should join this society. There are already many enlisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in the entire Monarchy; there are persons among them of intelligence and means, great heads; and if those can do it why should not we also, that we may contribute something to the work?"

Asked as to the aims the society pursued, Klaritch replied: "The society has as its object—for example, you are in Kalinovik, you tell me what the news is there, how many soldiers, cannon, how much

ammunition, different kinds of rifles, who comes and who goes, etc. We have a secret cipher, and correspond in it. If you are faithful you will receive it, too."

Jaglicitch was afraid that Klaritch was only trying to pump him in order thereafter to betray him, and therefore he begged him to name some of the members, whereupon Klaritch deliberated for a while, and then mentioned to Jaglicitch a name which he whispered to him in strictest confidence.

Thereupon Klaritch said to him, "Shall I give you the cipher?" Jaglicitch agreed. Klaritch, who knew the cipher by heart, wrote it out on a scrap of paper and handed it to Jaglicitch.

Another time Klaritch told about his sojourn in Banja-Koviljaca, (near Loznica,) where he had been trained in bomb-throwing by a Servian Captain, Todorovitch,\* and said in reply to an inquiry by the accused as to why he had learned this: "If it comes to anything, as I have already told you, it is necessary that I should understand how to handle bombs, that I should train you, and you train others, so that powder magazines and other important structures may be blown up. For that purpose we shall receive bombs from Servia."

Klaritch described the appearance of the bombs and said he already had enlisted people who would cut telegraph and telephone wires in the event of a war.

At these meetings Jaglicitch also learned from Klaritch that it is one of the aims of the members of the Narodna Odbrana to induce Austro-Hungarian soldiers to desert their colors, to recruit volunteers (komitadjis), and to organize bands, to blow up objects and depots, &c. Klaritch also informed him that even the cipher correspondence between the Servian and Bosnian members is not intrusted to the postal service, but is carried across the border by messengers.

Klaritch further told Jaglicitch that on the occasion of the Prosvjeta celebration, (in September, 1912), a Servian Major together with the deputation sent to this celebration from Servia lived in the Hotel Europe\*\* to which Klaritch led members of the Narodna Odbrana whom he swore in.

From a spy Jaglicitch learned that bombs would reach Serajevo or had already reached it, that these had the appearance of pieces of soap\*\*\* and that two or three pieces would be sent to this spy also or that he would fetch them himself.

\*Note.—Capt. Kosta Todorovitch was then actually Frontier Commissioner and Director of the Servian Customs Service for the border territory from Raca to Ljuboiija.

\*\*Note.—The Servian Major Mika Jankovitch appeared as a Servian delegate at the Prosvjeta celebration.

\*\*\*Note.—The bombs used against Archduke Francis Ferdinand in the assassination at Serajevo and those which were found in the year 1913 in the Save near Broko, originating from the Royal Servian Arsenal at Kragujevac bear a resemblance to pieces of soap.



**(ENCLOSURE 7.)****From Confidential Reports About the Narodna Odbrana.**

At the head of the Narodna Odbrana are representatives of all political parties, so that the Progressives and the opponents of the conspirators might co-operate. Its real moving spirit is the present Major Pribicevitch. The office of Secretary is always occupied by an officer on furlough.

The Narodna Odbrana seeks to develop in the south Slav portions of Austria-Hungary an effective propaganda in military and civil circles in order thus to prepare a revolution, disturb eventual mobilizations, precipitate panics and revolts, &c.

The organization has several confidential men and emissaries in the Monarchy who carry on a silent man-to-man propaganda. Individuals have special missions, such as, for instance, to enlist persons—wherever possible railroad officials—at important bridge and junction points for the task of carrying out instructions received at the proper moment, or getting them carried out.

Communication between the members of the Narodna Odbrana is carried out wherever possible through personal contact.

Chiefly young people, workingmen and railroad men are enrolled as members.

**(ENCLOSURE 8.)**

**Some Extracts from the Documents of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian District Court in Serajevo on the Prosecution of Gavrilo Princip and His Accomplices for the Crime of Assassination Committed on June 28, 1914, Against His Imperial and Royal Highness, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand of Austria-Este, and Her Highness, the Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg.**

**I.—The Act and its Authors.**

Gavrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, Trifko Grabez, Vaso Cubrilovitch, and Cetro Popovitch confessed that in common with the fugitive Mehemed Mehmedbasitch they formed a conspiracy for the murder of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and equipped with bombs and Browning pistols, lay in wait for his Highness on June 28, 1914, on his trip through Serajevo, with a view to carrying out the attack they had planned.

Nedeljko Gabrinovitch confesses to have been the first among the conspirators to throw a bomb against the carriage of the Archduke, but says that the bomb missed its aim and injured only those seated at the time of the explosion in the carriage following the automobile of the Archduke.

Gavrilo Princip confesses to having fired two shots from a Browning revolver upon the Archduke's automobile, by which the Archduke and the Duchess of Hohenberg were mortally wounded.

Both perpetrators admit murderous intent in the execution of their act.

Full corroboration of these confessions have been furnished by the investigations, and it is established that the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the late Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg died of the consequences of the revolver shots fired upon them by Gavrilo Princip.

## II.—Genesis of the Conspiracy.

The accused, agreeing in essentials, have given the following testimony before the examining Judge:

In April, 1914, Princip during his stay in Belgrade, where he associated in the local coffee houses with many Servian students, formed the plan for an attack upon the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand. This intention he discussed with Gabrinovitch, then also in Belgrade, who already was busying himself with the same thought, and who expressed immediate readiness to participate in the attack. The plans for the murderous attempt were frequently discussed among the persons with whom Princip and Gabrinovitch associated, since the Archduke was regarded as the most dangerous enemy of the Servian people.

Princip and Gabrinovitch at the outset proposed that the bombs and weapons necessary for the carrying out of the deed be obtained from the Servian Major, Milan Pribicevitch, or from the Narodna Odbrana because they themselves did not have the means to buy them. But inasmuch as Major Pribicevitch and the influential member of the society named Zivogin Dacitch were at that time away on travels, they decided to try to get the weapons from the former "komitadji," then an official of the State Railway, Milan Ciganovitch, whom they knew.

Princip got in touch with Ciganovitch through an intimate acquaintance of the latter. Ciganovitch thereupon sought out Princip, spoke with him about the plan of attack, which he fully approved, and declared that he would think over the request for weapons. Gabrinovitch also spoke with Ciganovitch about the weapons.

At Easter Princip took into his confidence Trifko Grabez, who was also present in Belgrade at the time, and who, according to his own confession, likewise declared himself ready to co-operate in the attack.

In the following period Princip repeatedly had conversations with Ciganovitch about the carrying out of the attack.

In the meanwhile Ciganovitch had placed himself in communication with the Servian Major, Voja Tankositch, an intimate friend

of his, about the proposed attack, and Tankositch thereupon placed at his disposal the Browning pistols for this service.

Grabez confesses, in corroboration of the evidence of Princip and of Gabrinovitch, that on May 24, in company with Ciganovitch, he visited Major Tankositch in the latter's home and at his request. After the introduction Tankositch said to Grabez: "Are you this man? Are you determined?" Whereupon Grabez replied: "I am he." When Tankositch asked, "Do you know how to shoot with a revolver?" Grabez answered in the negative. Tankositch said to Ciganovitch: "I will give you a revolver. Go and teach them how to shoot."

Thereupon Ciganovitch led Princip and Grabez to the army shooting range at Topcider and gave them instructions in shooting with Browning revolvers at targets in a wood near the range. Princip showed himself to be the better marksman. Ciganovitch also familiarized Princip, Grabez, and Cabrinovitch with the use of bombs, which were later turned over to them.

On May 27, 1914, Ciganovitch gave to Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez, according to their joint confession, six bombs, four Browning revolvers, and enough ammunition, as well as a glass tube containing cyanide of potassium so that they might, after carrying out their act, poison themselves with the view of keeping the secret. In addition Ciganovitch gave them money.

As early as Easter, Princip had instructed Danilo Ilitch about his plan for the attack. Upon returning to Serajevo he now begged Ilitch to enlist several more persons to insure the success of the attack. Thereupon Ilitch, according to his confession, enlisted for this Jaso Cubrilovitch, Cetro Popovitch, and Mehemed Mehemedbasitch.

### III.—Origin of the Bombs.

Only one of the bombs was at their disposal at the time of the carrying out of the attack. The remaining five were later found by the police in Serajevo.

These bombs, according to the opinion of experts in court, are Servian hand grenades, manufactured in a factory and destined for military use. They are identical with the twenty-one bombs which in the year 1913 were found in the Save at Brcko and some of which were still in the original package. By this it was shown with certainty that they had come from the Servian arms depot in Kragujevac.

It is established also that the bombs used in the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand originated from the army depot at Kragujevac.

Grabez of his own accord called the bombs which were handed over to him and his accomplices "Kragujevac bombs."

#### IV.—Transport of the Three Assassins and the Weapons from Servia to Bosnia.

The following testimony was given by Princip:

Ciganovitch told Gabrinovitch, Grabez and Princip to take their journey over Sabac and Loznica to Tuzla, and there turn to Misko Jovanovitch, who would take charge of the weapons. They should next go to Sabac, and there report to the border Captain, Major Rade Popovitch, for whom he gave them a note, which Princip carried. The three left Belgrade with their weapons on May 28. In Sabac, Princip delivered the note which he had received from Ciganovitch to Major Popovitch, who thereupon led all three to the commander's station (Kommando) and filled out a permit, in which it was certified that one of them was a revenue guard and the two others were his comrades. The permit also contained the name of this alleged revenue guard; but he had forgotten the name. At the same time Major Popovitch handed them a sealed letter for a border Captain in Loznica, whose name was Pravanovitch, Prdanovitch, or Predojevitch.

The next night Princip, Gabrinovitch, and Grabez spent in Sabac and went on the next day by train to Loznica, at half fare, on the strength of the permit that had been filled out for them by Major Popovitch. At noon they arrived in Loznica and handed to the local border Captain Major Popovitch's letter in which was written: "See that you receive these people and conduct them through to you know where." The Captain said that he would call his revenue guards from the border and intrust the three to the most reliable man. Thereupon he telephoned, and ordered the three accomplices to report at his office at 7 o'clock the next morning.

On the next morning the three conspirators agreed that Cabrino-vitch, with the pass of Grabez, should openly take the road to Zvornik, but that Princip and Grabez should cross the border secretly. This plan was discussed with the border Captain and it was hereby agreed that a revenue guard from Ljesnica, named Grbitch, should take Princip and Grabez in his karaula and conduct them across the line. Gabrinovitch went on foot to Banja Koviljaca, in the direction of Zvornik. Princip and Grabez rode with the revenue guard, Grbitch, to Ljesnica, where they deposited the bombs and the revolvers in a hotel room. Here the revenue guard Grbitch saw these objects. Princip himself characterized the journey as "mysterious."

The testimony of Grabez agreed with that of Princip on the essential points and he added by way of supplement that Grbitch laughed when he saw the bombs and revolvers and only asked whither in Bosnia they were going with these bombs. The revenue guard certainly thought Grabez and Princip had a mission.

Grbitch and a second revenue guard brought Princip and Grabez

in a rowboat to an island in the Drina. There Grbitch instructed them to wait for a peasant who would fetch them. They spent the night on the island in a peasant's cottage to which Grbitch had directed them. On the next day a peasant took them during the night, first through a swamp and then across the hills to neighborhood to Priboj, where he turned them over to the local teacher Cubrilovitch, who seemed to have been waiting for them. The latter then took them to Tuzla, to Misko Jovanovitch.

Gabrinovitch testified concerning the happenings on the trip up to the moment in which he separated from Princip and Grabez in a manner that corroborated the essentials of what they had said, and added that Major Popovitch had told them he had come from Belgrade only on the day before their arrival in Sabac.

In Loznica, Gabrinovitch, Princip, and Grabez decided to separate, since it would be dangerous for them to go together. The border Captain in Loznica, whom they informed of this, expressed his approval of their plan and gave Gabrinovitch a letter for the teacher, M. Jaklojevitch, in Mali-Zvornik. Gabrinovitch thereupon turned over the bombs which he had carried, the Browning and ammunition, to Princip and Grabez, and in company with a revenue guard, who had been given to him as escort, went to Mali-Zvornik.

There he found the teacher, Jaklojevitch, to whom he handed the letter of the border Captain of Loznica. The latter advised the Servian guard. When Gabrinovitch later reached this frontier guard with the teacher there was waiting there for them a man who brought them in a rowboat across the Drina to Greater Zvornik in Bosnia.

From there Gabrinovitch went to Tuzla to Misko Jovanovitch.

Cubrilovitch, the teacher, who undertook to guide Princip and Grabez at Priboj, has made a complete confession, from which the following important points are summarized:

In 1911 Cubrilovitch, as a result of a Sokol excursion to Sabac, was made a member of the Narodna Odbrana through Bozo Fovitch, a member of the Board of Directors, and then made Commissioner of the Narodna Odbrana in Zvornik (Bosnia). On his invitation Misko Johanovitch was later made Commissioner of the Narodna Odbrana for Tuzla.

A peasant acted as go-between in the dealings with Narodna Odbrana, the same peasant who brought Princip and Grabez to Cubrilovitch with the news that he was bringing two armed Servian students with him. When he learned this he said that he knew this was a "message" of the Narodna Odbrana. Princip and Grabez told him that they had bombs and revolvers for an attempt on the life of Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

### Supplement.

Just before the close of this memoir, a sworn statement is produced by the District Court in Serajevo, from which it appears that a subject of the monarchy some days before the 28th of June of this year wished to notify the Imperial and Royal Consulate in Belgrade that a murderous attack had been planned against Archduke Francis Ferdinand during his stay in Bosnia. This witness, it is said, was prevented from giving this information by the Belgrade police, who, on a trivial pretext, arrested him before he could enter the Imperial and Royal Consulate. The sworn testimony and the cross examination indicate that the Servian police officials had knowledge of the attack that was planned and only arrested this man to prevent him from furnishing the information.

Inasmuch as these statements have not yet been investigated, no judgment can yet be given as to their ability to stand the test. In consideration of the importance attaching to this, the further details of this testimony can at the present time not be divulged.

### (ENCLOSURE 9.)

#### The Servian Press on the Assassination.

(a) The Belgrade newspaper Balkan on June 29 wrote concerning the two assassinations:

"Nedeljko Gabrinovitch, a typesetter, was imbued with anarchistic ideas and known as a restless spirit. Up to twenty days ago he lived in Belgrade, where he had gone after the war and found employment in the State printing plant. Before he left he said he was going to Trieste, where he expected to obtain work in a new printing plant. Gavrilo Princip also sojourned until recently in Belgrade. In the course of the war he volunteered for army service, but was not accepted; so he left Belgrade. But he returned to Belgrade on Christmas of the preceding year, attended the gymnasium for a while, and departed from Belgrade at about the same time as Gabrinovitch, but by a different route. Princip was silent, nervous, a good scholar, and associated with several fellow-students who likewise came from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in later times with Gabrinovitch. He inclined toward socialist ideas, although he originally belonged to the Progressive youth. Princip as well as Gabrinovitch had grown up in Serajevo; both had been united in inseparable friendship since their childhood."

(b) It is pointed out in the Piémont of July 1 that the loud protest of the assailant Zerajitch was followed by the protest of Princip. The work of the latter could likewise be explained by reason of the Bosnian Government system. The fact that Princip carried out his act of vengeance on the sacred national holiday of Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day), the day fixed for the carrying on of manoeuvres, makes the

desperate deed of the young martyr appear more intelligible and natural.

(The paper was confiscated by the police because of this article, but the confiscation was annulled on the following day by the Belgrade court of first resort.)

(c) The Young Radical paper, *Odjek*, of July 3 says: "Archduke Francis Ferdinand was sent to Serajevo on the day of national enthusiasm to celebrate a brutal manifestation of power and subjection. This brutal act was bound to evoke brutal feeling of resistance, of hatred, and of revenge."

(d) The National Party organ, *Srpska Zastava*, says in an article of July 3, headed "Suspensions and Threats": "The assassination appears even more and more the result of unhealthy conditions in the monarchy. On the other hand, the savage persecution of the Serb people in Bosnia and Herzegovina excites the horror of the whole civilized world."

(e) The Progressive paper, *Pravda*, of July 3 writes: "The Vienna policy is cynical. It is exploiting the death of the unfortunate couple for its repulsive purposes against the Servian people."

(f) The Agence des Balkans of July 3 reports: "The crimes practiced in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbs have been carried out under the auspices and direct incitation of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military authorities."

(g) The *Pravda* of July 4 says: "All murders and attacks heretofore committed in Austria have had one and the same origin. The oppressed peoples of the monarchy were obliged to resort to this kind of protest, because no other way was open to them. In the chaos of a reign of terror it is natural and understandable that the era of murderous attacks should become popular."

(h) The *Balkan* of July 5 remarks that Austria-Hungary, "because of its persecution of the innocent, must be put under international control," since Austria-Hungary was less consolidated than Turkey.

(i) The *Mali Journal* of July 7 says: "A scion of the Middle Ages was murdered in Serajevo a few days ago. He was murdered by a boy who felt the suffering of his enslaved fatherland to the point of paroxysms of emotion—the suffering which the despoilers of the lands of his fathers had inflicted upon it. What has official Austria-Hungary done thereafter? It has replied with general massacres, plunderings, and destruction of Serb life and property. By such exploits only those who are worthless distinguish themselves. The cowards are always great heroes when they are certain that nothing will happen to them. Only compare Princip and Gabrinovitch with these heroes, and the great difference will be noted at once. Civilization and justice in Austria-Hungary are a great, gross falsehood."

(j) The Tribuna of July 7 says: "We are of the opinion that the murderous deed of Serajevo was ordered to the end that the extermination of the Serbs might be accomplished with one blow."

(k) The Piémont of July 8 reports from Bajina Baschka that the Austrian authorities in Bosnia were preparing a massacre of the "Christians."

(l) The Balkan of the 8th publishes a report from Bosnia, under the heading "St. Bartholomew's Night in Serajevo," and advocates a general boycott of all Austrians resident in Servia.

(m) The Mali Journal of the 8th demands a boycott against the Danube Steamship Company.

(n) Under the caption, "Nothing from Austria-Hungary!" the Tribuna of the 8th writes that it is best to buy no goods originating in Austria-Hungary, not to visit the Austrian and Hungarian baths, and not to call any physicians from Austria-Hungary. Private initiative, it says, could accomplish much in the direction indicated. The State and the authorities would not have to take action. It would be enough to appeal to the citizens.

(o) It is stated in the Stampa of the 8th that the police at Serajevo were subjecting the arrested assailants to the most shameless and inhuman torture in order to force confessions from them, to be used as the basis for an indictment of the Servian people.

(q) Commenting upon the statement by Premier Asquith, upon being informed of the death of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, that he despaired for humanity, The Balkan on July 9 published a historical survey of the events of the last forty years, from which it concludes that the Servian people in that period were subjected to the terrible tortures of the Jesuit policy of Austria-Hungary. Finally Archduke Francis Ferdinand, like all sons of Loyola who only work in the blood of human beings and believe in the principle that "the end justifies the means," was inexorably overtaken by fate and fell a victim to Jesuitism, even as entire Austria-Hungary will. But by the fall of Austria-Hungary humanity shall obtain peace and freedom. When one recapitulates all these truths, one must reach the conclusion that Asquith could with calm spirit have met the announcement of the death with the words, "I no longer despair for humanity."

(r) In a leading article The Politika of July 9 says, under the caption "Shameless Lie": "The manner and fashion in which the investigation of the Serajevo attack is being conducted point openly to the ends which Austria is pursuing. Since the assailants, despite all the torments inflicted upon them, refuse to state what is demanded of them, other individuals have been discovered, with difficulty, who



declared themselves ready, under certain conditions, to confess to a certain complicity in the attack, but at the same time to accuse all those who are inconvenient for Austria. This method for the time being has succeeded, for the hired individuals show a willingness to say anything that one wants of them, and the Austrian police take care that these lies are at once circulated broadcast. Austria has no shame, and it believes that some one will be found who will believe such lies."

(s) The Stampa of the 9th says that not everything that has occurred in Bosnia and Herzegovina has yet been uncovered and brought out to publicity. Much, it says, is being concealed. But truth will sooner or later come to the surface for all that. Blood-thirsty Austria simply wants to sate herself now with Servian blood, and is doing it. It is reported that there are to-day about 10,000 dead and wounded in Bosnia.

(t) The Politika of July 10 hurls unmeasured insults at members of the Imperial House.

(u) The Trgovinski Glasnik of July 10 speaks of the corruptness and unscrupulousness of the Austro-Hungarian policy, which it calls "Jesuitical, ruthless, and dishonorable." It ought to convince the Serb people in Austria-Hungary that they do not dwell in a civilized State which guarantees life and property, but that they must ever be armed and ready to defend themselves against robbery by the authorities and the Government. After the latest events, the Servian people must no longer wait like a lamb that might be slaughtered any day, but like a lion ready for bloody defense.

(v) The Stampa of July 10 says: "Nothing is eternal, and Austria-Hungary will not remain forever in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The time is not distant when the Serbs, who broke the power of the Turks and punished the Bulgarians, will range over the Ivan Planina on the Trebevitich."

(w) Under the title "Boycott Against the Worthless," the Pravda of July 10 demands a boycott of Austro-Hungarian firms in Belgrade as well as of Austro-Hungarian wares, and says that it is the duty of the Narodna Odbrana to promote the strictest execution of the boycott.

(x) The Zvono of July 16 declares Princip a son of Countess Lonyay, to whom the task was allotted to avenge the death of the Crown Prince Rudolf on his murderer, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand.

(y) In The Mali Journal of July 19 occurs the following: "Princip was instigated to the attack by an Austro-Hungarian agent. In

Vienna it is said that the really guilty person could be found only in the Austro-Hungarian Embassy at Belgrade."

(z) The leading Young Radical paper, *Odjek*, of July 20 writes: "Austria-Hungary indicates by a hundred signs that it wishes to inherit the title of the sick Man of Europe. While in Serbia not a single Austro-Hungarian citizen was molested, villages and cities were plundered in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This fact shows afresh how much higher Serbia stands, morally and culturally, than Austria-Hungary."

### (ENCLOSURE 10.)

#### **The Committee of the Narodna Odbrana at Nish on the Crime Against Archduke Francis Ferdinand.**

To the Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has come from a trustworthy informant, whose name can be given if necessary, reliable information that the Committee of the Narodna Odbrana recently held a session at Nish, in which its Chairman, the Director of the Nish House of Correction, Jasa Nenadovitch, spoke of the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and told the following:

Servia was compelled absolutely to avail herself of some means like the attack on Archduke Francis Ferdinand, since the latter, on account of his aggressive and eccentric character, was a formidable danger to Servia and, possibly, to other Slavic groups. Had he remained alive, he would soon have challenged Servia to war or attacked that country, in which case Servia, which is now so materially weakened and which has not finished organizing its army, would unquestionably have been hopelessly beaten. But as matters stand, Servia has been saved by the Serajevo murder and, moreover, one of the men dangerous to Servia has been removed. Servia will now have quiet for some years, since the new Heir Apparent will certainly think twice before he follows in the footsteps of his predecessor.

The speaker was aware, he continued, that the murder of the Archduke would be a severe blow and a bitter sorrow to Austria-Hungary, and that it would cause the Serbs living there to be persecuted, but he did not think his suppositions would be so completely justified by events as they had been, and that the Croatians would rise to the requirements of the moment as they had risen. He said that his friends in Bosnia and Herzegovina had assured him that the Austro-Hungarian officials were timid and would not go too far, but that these friends had been deceived and that we had been deceived through them; that if things continued thus, revolvers and bombs had yet to play their real parts, and whatever the Servian God might ordain, things could not continue in this way.

The statements of the speaker found complete support from those who heard him.

**(ENCLOSURE 11.)**

**Anti-Austro-Hungarian Paintings in the Ministry of War at Belgrade.**

Before the Reception Hall of the Servian Ministry of War there are on the wall four allegorical paintings, of which three are representations of Servian victories, while the fourth pictures the realization of Servia's anti-Austrian aspirations.

Over a landscape, part mountain (Bosnia), and part plain (Southern Hungary), there is shown the "zora," or dawning of Servian hopes. In the foreground is an armed woman upon whose shield are the names of all the provinces "yet to be freed"—Bosnia, Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Syrmia, Dalmatia, &c.

**XX.**

**Count Berchtold to Baron Macchio, Councilor Austro-Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.**

(Telegram.)

Lambach, July 25th, 1914.

The Russian Chargé d'Affairs has informed me by telegraph that his government has urgently instructed him to demand an extension of the time-limit in the ultimatum to Servia. I request you to reply to him in my behalf, that we cannot consent to an extension of the time-limit. You will please add that, even after the breaking off of diplomatic relations, Servia will be in a position to bring about an amicable settlement by an unconditional acceptance of our demands. In such case, however, we would be compelled to demand from Servia an indemnification for all costs and damages caused to us by our military measures.

**XXI.**

**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Peterburg.**

(Telegram.)

Bad Ischl, July 25th, 1914.

For your personal information and guidance:

The Russian Chargé d'Affaires called on Baron Macchio this forenoon and requested in his Government's behalf that the time-limit stipulated in our note to Servia be extended.

This request he based upon the ground that our move had taken the Powers by surprise and that the Russian Government would consider it a matter of due consideration on the part of the Vienna Cabinet toward the other cabinets, if the latter should be given an opportunity to examine the merits of our communication to the Powers and to study the promised dossier. Baron Macchio replied to the Chargé d'Affaires that he would advise me at once of his request, but he could already venture to say that there is no probability of a prolongation of the stipulated time-limit being conceded by us.

As to the explanations given by the Russian Government in substantiation of its request, they appear to be based upon an erroneous conception of the premises. Our note to the Powers was by no means meant as an invitation to them to inform us of their views on this matter, but simply to convey information as a matter of international courtesy. Besides, we hold that our action concerns solely ourselves and Servia, and that this action, despite the patience and leniency which we have displayed for many years, had been forced upon us by the developments of a situation which compelled us to defend our most vital interests.

## XXII.

**Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Belgrade, July 25th, 1914.

The Cabinet met in council last night and this morning. According to various reports the reply to our note will be handed to me before the expiration of the stipulated time. I hear that the court train is being made ready for use; that the money of the National Bank and of the Railroad as well as the archives of the Foreign Office are being removed to the interior of the country. Several of my colleagues are of the opinion that they must follow the Government, especially so the Russian legation, where packing is proceeding.

The garrison has left town in field equipment. The ammunition has been removed from the fortress. There is a considerable movement of troops at the railway station. Sanitary convoys have left Belgrade in a southerly direction. According to the instructions which I have meanwhile received, we shall leave Belgrade by train at 6.30 o'clock if diplomatic relations are broken off.

## XXIII.

**Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Semlin, July 25, 1914.

General mobilization has been ordered in Servia at 3 P. M.

## XXIV.

**Baron von Giesl to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Semlin, July 25th, 1914.

The reply of the Royal Servian Government to our demands of the 23rd instant being inadequate, I have broken off diplomatic relations with Servia and have left Belgrade with the staff of the legation.

The reply was handed to me at 5.58 P. M.

## XXV.

**Note of the Royal Servian Government, Dated July 12/25, 1914.**

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and is

convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Serbia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were discontinued as a result of the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal status created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government calls attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation, except one concerning a school book, when the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia in numerous instances has given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is due to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that the same has been preserved. The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule are beyond official control. The Royal Government is all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary it showed much consideration and thus succeeded in settling most of these questions to the mutual advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government has been painfully surprised at the allegations that citizens of the Kingdom of Serbia have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government had expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all that concerns this crime, and it stood ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations might be made to it.

Complying with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, it is prepared to commit for trial any Servian subject, regardless of his station or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs shall be produced, and more especially it undertakes to publish on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th/26th July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Serbia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, and in general all the tendencies

which aim at the ultimate detachment from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal activities.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost rigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To insert, at the first ordinary convocation of the Skuptchina, a provision into the press law for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government engages, at the impending revision of the Constitution, to add to Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment permitting that such publications be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible according to the clear provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution.

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Narodna Odbrana" Society and every other association which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes to remove without delay from the system of public instruction in Servia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with facts and proofs of such a propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also agrees to remove from the military and the civil service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly understand the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of officials of the Imperial and Royal Government upon Servian territory, but it declares that it will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it a duty to begin an inquiry against all such persons as are, or eventually may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who may happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankositch. As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been possible to arrest him.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt as well as the possible proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the Servian inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for suppressing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that the Servian government will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly furnish explanations of the remarks made by its officials, whether in Servia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communicated to it the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as it shall have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, in connection with which the Royal Government itself will take steps to collect evidence.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to take precipitate action in the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal at The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

## XXVI.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

In resolving to proceed firmly against Servia, we are fully aware that a conflict with Russia may result from the existing Servian differences. Yet, in determining our attitude toward Servia, we could not allow ourselves to be influenced by this possibility, because fundamental considerations of our home policy have forced us to put an end to a situation which enables Servia, under Russia's promise of immunity, to threaten this empire constantly and to do so unpunished and unpunishable.

In case Russia should consider that the moment for an accounting with the Central European Powers has come, and therefore *a priori* be resolved to make war, the following instructions would appear to be useless.

Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that Russia might reconsider her attitude and not permit herself to be carried away by the warlike element, in case Servia should refuse to comply with our demands and we should be compelled, in consequence, to resort to force.

The following is designed for the latter emergency and it is left to your discretion to make proper use of it at the right time and in a suitable manner in your conference with M. Sazonow and the prime minister.



I presume that under the present circumstances you are in close touch with your German colleague, who has surely been instructed by his Government not to allow the Russian Government any room for doubt that Austria-Hungary would not stand alone in the event of a conflict with Russia.

I have no doubt that it will not be an easy task to bring Sazonow to a true appreciation of our action at Belgrade, which has been forced upon us.

But there is one point which cannot fail to impress the Russian Foreign Minister, namely, an emphatic statement by you to the effect that Austria-Hungary, in conformity with her established principle of disinterestedness, is guided by no selfish motive in the present crisis, although the situation has culminated in warlike action.

The Monarchy is sated with territory and has no desire for Servian lands. If war with Serbia be forced upon us, it will be for us not a war of conquest, but of self-defence and self-preservation.

The contents of the circular note, which in itself is sufficiently comprehensive, may be placed in a still more convincing light by a study of the dossier referring to the Servian propaganda against the Dual Monarchy and the relation between this propaganda and the crime of June the 28th.

You will therefore, call the Russian Foreign Minister's special attention to this dossier and point out to him that there is no precedent of a Great Power tolerating so long and with such unexampled forbearance the seditious agitations of a small neighbor.

We had no wish to adopt a policy adverse to the free development of the Christian Balkan States, and therefore we have permitted Serbia to almost double her territory since the annexation crisis of 1908, although we knew how little Servian promises are worth.

Since then the subversive movement fostered against the Monarchy in Serbia has become so excessive, that Austria-Hungary's vital interests and even her dynasty are seriously menaced by Serbia's underground activities.

We must presume that conservative and dynastic Russia will not only understand our energetic action against such a menace to public order, but will even regard it as imperative.

On reaching this point in your conversation with M. Sazonow it will be necessary to state, in addition to your explanation of our motives and intentions, that, although we have no ambitions for territorial expansion and do not intend to infringe upon the integrity of Serbia, as you already have pointed out, still we are determined to go to any length to ensure the acceptance of our demands.

The course of the last 40 years, as well as the historical fact that our gracious Sovereign has acquired the glorious name of "Guardian of the Peace," attest that we have always held peace to

be the most sacred blessing of the people, and that, in so far as it depended on us, we have endeavored to maintain it.

We would all the more regret a disturbance of the peace of Europe, because of our conviction that the evolution of the Balkan states toward national and political independence could only improve our relations with Russia, eliminating all possibilities of a clash of interests with that empire, and because in framing our own policy we always have been disposed to respect the important political interests of Russia.

To tolerate the Servian machinations any longer, however, would undermine our national existence and our standing as a Great Power, and would, therefore, imperil the European balance of power—an equilibrium the maintenance of which, we are convinced, the peace-loving statesmen of Russia regard as essential to their own interests. Our action against Servia, whatever form it may take, is altogether conservative and has no object except the necessary maintenance of our position in Europe.

## XXVII.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 25, 1914.

As clause 5 of our demands, which concerns the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the suppression of the subversive agitation in Servia, has called forth M. Sazonow's particular objection, you are instructed to give him the strictly confidential information that the insertion of this clause is due to merely practical considerations and is not intended as an infringement on Servia's sovereignty. The "collaboration" mentioned in clause 5 refers to the creation in Belgrade of a secret *bureau de sûreté* which would work like the similar Russian institution in Paris and would co-operate with the Servian police and administration.

## XXVIII.

Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, July 26, 1914.

Reports concerning Russian mobilization have caused Count Pourtalés to call the Russian minister's earnest attention to the fact that an attempt to exert diplomatic pressure by means of mobilization is extremely dangerous at this juncture. In such an event the military considerations of the General Staff will be supreme and the situation will become irrevocable once "the button had been pressed" by the chief of staff in Germany. M. Sazonow gave the German Ambassador his word of honor that the reports of a mobilization were unfounded, that for the present not one horse had been levied, not one

reservist called, and that merely preparatory measures were being taken in the military districts of Kieff and Odessa, and possibly of Kazan and Moscow.

Immediately afterwards a courier delivered to the German Military Attaché a request to call on the Minister of War. Suchomlinow, referring to Count Pourtalés's conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the subject of Russian military preparations, stated that, as the Ambassador might possibly have misunderstood some details pertaining to military questions, he would be prepared to give the Military Attaché fuller information. Major von Eggeling's report was summarized in the following telegram which Count Pourtalés sent to Berlin and placed at my disposal:

Military Attaché reports on conversation with Russian Minister of War:

M. Sazonow has requested him to enlighten me concerning military situation. Minister of War gave me his word of honor that no order whatever had as yet been issued for mobilization. For the present merely preparatory measures were being taken, no horse levied, no reservist called. In case Austria-Hungary were to cross Servian boundary, the military districts adjoining Austria (Kieff, Odessa, Moscow, Kazan) would be mobilized. Under no circumstances would mobilization extend to districts of Warsaw, Vilna and St. Petersburg, bordering on Germany. Peace with Germany is earnestly desired. In answer to my question as to object of mobilization against Austria-Hungary, War Minister shrugged his shoulders and hinted at diplomatic influences. I pointed out to War Minister that we should appreciate friendly disposition but consider mobilization against Austria-Hungary alone as decidedly threatening. War Minister repeatedly and insistently laid stress on absolute necessity and desire for peace.

## XXIX.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

M. von Tschirschky informed me to-day under instructions that, according to a telegram sent from London on the 25th instant, at 3 p. m., by Prince Lichnowsky, Sir Edward Grey had forwarded the latter a draft of Servia's reply together with a personal letter expressing the hope that, in view of the conciliatory tenor of the reply, the Berlin Cabinet would recommend its acceptance in Vienna.

I consider it advisable that you should revert to this matter and call the Foreign Secretary's attention to the fact that, almost of the time when he sent his note to Prince Lichnowsky, i. e., yesterday at 3 p. m., Servia had already ordered a general mobilization; this goes to prove that there was no inclination in Belgrade for a peaceful

settlement. The unsatisfactory reply, which, it appears, had previously been wired to London, was not handed to the Imperial and Royal Minister in Belgrade until 6 p. m., after the mobilization order had been issued.

### XXX.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburg.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 26, 1914.

Servia having rejected our demands, we have broken off diplomatic relation with that country.

You are instructed to call immediately on the Foreign Secretary or his representative and frame your statement as follows:

The Royal Servian Government has refused to comply with the demands which we had been compelled to make upon it in order to permanently safeguard our most vital interests, which Servia is menacing. In so doing Servia has manifested her unwillingness to abandon her subversive tactics, which are directed at fomenting disturbances in some of our border territories with a view to their eventual separation from the Dual Monarchy. To our regret, and much against our wish, we have been placed under the necessity of employing the severest measures to compel Servia to modify radically her hitherto hostile attitude toward us.

### XXXI.

**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, July 27, 1914.

I have just had a long conversation with M. Sazonow. I told the Minister I was under the impression that the nature of our action had been misunderstood in Russia. We were suspected of contemplating an attack upon the Balkans, and of intending to march upon Saloniki or possibly even upon Constantinople. Others go so far as to describe our action as the beginning of a preventive war against Russia. I declared all this to be erroneous and in a sense absurd. The purpose of our action is merely self-preservation and self-defence against a hostile propaganda threatening the integrity of the monarchy, carried on by word, writing and deed. No one in Austria-Hungary would think of threatening Russian interests or picking a quarrel with Russia.

We were, however, resolved to reach the goal which we had in view, and the road which we had chosen seemed to us the most effective. As we had embarked upon an action of self-defence, I emphasized the fact that we could not allow ourselves to be diverted by any consequences whatsoever.

M. Sazonow agreed with me in principle. He recognized our aim as a perfectly legitimate one, but expressed the opinion that the

method we had selected for its attainment was not happy in its form. He had studied the note since its presentation, he observed, and would like to peruse it once more with me, if I had time to do so.

I responded that I was at his disposal, but was neither authorized to discuss the wording of the note nor to give an interpretation of it. His remarks, however, would be of greatest interest. The minister then analyzed all the points of our note and this time found that seven of the ten clauses were, on the whole, acceptable. He took exception only to the two clauses dealing with the coöperation of Austria-Hungarian officials in Serbia and to the clause concerning the dismissal of officers and officials to be designated by us. Those clauses he qualified as unacceptable in their present form. With reference to the two first clauses, I found myself in a position to give an authentic interpretation in the sense of your telegram of the 25th instant. The third clause I qualified as a necessary demand. In any case events had been set in motion. The Servias had mobilized as early as yesterday, and I was ignorant of what had happened since.

### XXXII.

**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

I authorize you to tell M. Sazonow that Austria-Hungary has no intention whatever to make any territorial conquests, as long as the war remains localized between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

### XXXIII.

**Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Berlin, July 27, 1914.

M. Sazonow declared to the German Ambassador that he could "guarantee that no mobilization had been effected by Russia. Certain essential military precautions had been taken, however."

German military attaché in St. Petersburg reports that "the Russian minister of war had given him his word of honor that not one man or horse had been mobilized; yet certain military precautions had, of course, been taken"; precautions which, however, are "fairly extensive," in the personal opinion of the military attaché, expressed in his report.

### XXXIV.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in Berlin, Rome, London, Paris and St. Petersburg.**

Vienna, July 27, 1914.

You will receive herewith the text of the note which was handed to the Imperial and Royal Minister in Serbia on July the 25th by the Royal Servian Government, and our comments thereon.

## ENCLOSURE.

### **Note of the Royal Servian Government to the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government, dated 12/25th July, 1914, and Comments Thereon.**

#### **Servian Reply to Austrian Government.**

The Royal Servian Government has received the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government of the 10th instant, and is convinced that its reply will remove any misunderstanding which may threaten to impair the good neighborly relations between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and the Kingdom of Servia.

Conscious of the fact that the protests which were made both from the tribune of the national Skuptchina and in the declarations and actions of the responsible representatives of the State—protests which were discontinued as a result of the declarations made by the Servian Government on the 18th March, 1909—have not been renewed on any occasion as regards the great neighboring Monarchy, and that no attempt has been made since that time, either by the successive Royal Governments or by their organs, to change the political and legal status created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Royal Government calls attention to the fact that in this connection the Imperial and Royal Government has made no representation, except

#### **Comments of the Austro-Hun- garian Government.**

The Royal Servian Government confines itself to the statement that no endeavor has been made by either the Servian Government or its officers to modify the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina since the declaration of the 18th of March, 1909.

Thereby it deliberately evades the basic point in our representations, as we have not asserted that the Servian Government or its officers have officially undertaken anything to that end.

Our grievance, however, is that the Servian Government has omitted to suppress the agitation directed against the territorial integrity of the Dual Monarchy, notwithstanding the obligations it entered into under the terms of the above-mentioned note.

The Servian Government, there-

one concerning a school book, when the Imperial and Royal Government received an entirely satisfactory explanation. Serbia in numerous instances has given proofs of her pacific and moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is due to Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive interest of European peace that the same has been preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the press and the peaceable work of societies—manifestations which take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of events, and which as a general rule are beyond official control. The Royal Government is all the less responsible, in view of the fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary it showed much consideration and thus succeeded in setting most of these questions to the mutual advantage of the two neighboring countries.

For these reasons the Royal Government has been painfully surprised at the allegations that citizens of the Kingdom of Serbia have participated in the preparations for the crime committed at Serajevo; the Royal Government had expected to be invited to collaborate in an investigation of all

fore, was in duty bound to a radical change in the trend of its policy and to establish good neighborly relations with Austria-Hungary; and not merely to refrain from official attempts to dispute the status of Bosnia as an integral part of the Dual Monarchy.

The contention of the Royal Servian Government that utterances of the press and the activities of associations have a private character and are beyond the control of the State, is plainly at variance with the institutions of modern States, even of those which have the most liberal regulations in this respect; these regulations, designed to safeguard public polity and right, impose State supervision upon both press and associations. Moreover, the Servian institutions themselves provide for such supervision. The charge against the Servian Government is that it completely failed to supervise the Servian press and associations, although it well knew that both were engaged in a campaign against the Monarchy.

This assertion is incorrect. The Servian Government had been fully informed of the suspicion raised against certain designated persons, and therefore was not only in a position spontaneously to institute an investigation, but was even bound to do so by its own laws. It has done nothing

that concerns this crime, and it stood ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of its attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom representations might be made to it.

Complying with the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, it is prepared to commit for trial any Servian subject, regardless of his station or rank, of whose complicity in the crime of Serajevo proofs shall be produced, and more especially it undertakes to publish on the first page of the "Journal officiel," on the date of the 13th/26th July, the following declaration:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns every propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary, and in general all the tendencies which aim at the ultimate detachment from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy of territories belonging to it, and it sincerely deplores the fatal consequences of these criminal activities.

"The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated, according to the communication of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the above-mentioned propaganda and thus compromised the good neighborly relations to which the Royal Government was solemnly pledged by its declaration of the 31st of March, 1909.

"The Royal Government, which disapproves and repudiates all idea of interfering or attempting to interfere with the destinies of

at all in this respect.

Our demand read as follows:

"The Royal Government of Servia condemns the propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary . . . ."

The alteration made by the Royal Servian Government in the declaration demanded by us implies either that such a propaganda against Austria-Hungary does not exist, or that its existence is not within the knowledge of the Royal Government. This formula is insincere and equivocal; it is intended to furnish the Servian Government with a loophole for future emergencies. The Servian Government might, in future, interpret this declaration as neither a disavowal of the existing propaganda, nor an admission of its hostility to the Monarchy; it might, furthermore, base thereon the claim that it is not bound to suppress any future propaganda similar to the present



the inhabitants of any part whatsoever of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty formally to warn officers and functionaries, and the whole population of the Kingdom, that henceforth it will proceed with the utmost vigor against persons who may be guilty of such machinations, which it will use all its efforts to prevent and suppress."

This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal Army in an order of the day, in the name of his Majesty the King, by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be published in the next official army bulletin.

The Royal Government further undertakes:

1. To insert, at the first ordinary convocation of the Skuptchina, a provision into the press law for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any publication the general tendency of which is directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary.

The Government engages, at the impending revision of the Constitution, to add to Article 22 of the Constitution an amendment permitting that such publications be confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible according to the clear provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution.

one.

The wording of our demand was: "The Royal Government regrets that Servian officers and functionaries have participated in . . ." By the additional phrase, "according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government," the Royal Servian Government seeks, as indicated above, to keep a free hand for the future.

We had demanded:

1. The suppression of "any publication which incites to hatred and contempt of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and the general tendency of which is directed against its territorial integrity."

We thus wished to establish Serbia's obligation to provide for the prevention of such press attacks in the future; we wished, therefore, to secure definite results in the present instance.

Servia, instead, offers to decree certain laws intended to serve as means to that purpose, to wit:

- (a) A law providing individual punishment of above-mentioned press utterances hostile to the Dual Monarchy. This is all the more immaterial to us, as it is a notorious fact that individual prosecution of press offences is

very rarely possible, and as, furthermore, the lax application of such a law would leave unpunished even the few cases that might be prosecuted. This proposal, therefore, in no way meets our demand, as it gives no guarantee whatever for the results desired by us.

(b) An addition to Article 22 of the constitution, permitting confiscation, as referred to in the Servian note. This proposal likewise must fail to satisfy us. The existence of such a law in Servia is of no avail to us, whereas only a pledge by the Government to apply it would be useful. This, however, has not been promised to us.

These proposals are, therefore, quite unsatisfactory, all the more so because they are also evasive, as they do not state the time within which these laws shall be decreed. Besides, no provision is made for the event of a rejection of the bills by the Skuptchina—not to mention a possible resignation of the Cabinet—in which case matters would remain unchanged.

2. The Government possesses no proof, nor does the note of the Imperial and Royal Government furnish it with any, that the "Narodna Odbrana" and other similar societies have committed up to the present any criminal act of this nature through the proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal Government will accept the demands of the Imperial and Royal Government and will dissolve the "Na-

The propaganda against the Monarchy conducted by the "Narodna Odbrana" and its affiliated associations permeates the entire public life of Servia; the Servian Government's declaration that it knows nothing about this propaganda, is, therefore, an absolutely inadmissible act of evasion. Setting this contention aside, our demand is not wholly met, as we have also demanded:

The confiscation of the means

rodna Odbrana" Society and every other association which may be directing its efforts against Austria-Hungary.

3. The Royal Servian Government undertakes to remove without delay from the system of public instruction in Serbia all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government shall furnish it with facts and proofs of such a propaganda.

4. The Royal Government also

of propaganda of these societies.

The prevention of the reorganization of the dissolved societies under other names and in other guise.

These two points the Belgrade Government ignores, thus eliminating even the guarantee which the preceding half-promise would imply that the proposed dissolution would put an end, once for all, to the activities of the societies hostile to the Dual Monarchy, and especially of the "Narodna Odbrana."

In this case, be it noted, moreover, the Servian Government first demands proofs that a propaganda against the Monarchy is being carried on in Serbia's public instruction; this, too, when the Servian Government must know that the books in use in Servian schools contain much objectionable matter, and that a large number of the Servian teachers are connected with the Narodna Odbrana and its affiliated associations.

The Servian Government has again in this instance failed to comply with our demand in the way indicated by us, inasmuch as the phrase, "with regard to both the teaching-staff and the means of instruction," has been omitted in the Servian note. In this eliminated phrase are clearly pointed out the mediums whereby the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is being conducted in the Servian schools.

If the dismissal of the military

agrees to remove from the military and the civil service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it expects the Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to it at a later day the names and the acts of these officers and officials for the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against them.

5. The Royal Government must confess that it does not clearly understand the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial and Royal Government that Servia shall undertake to accept the collaboration of officials of the Imperial and Royal Government upon Servian territory, but it declares that it will admit such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government considers it a duty to begin an inquiry against all such persons as are, or possibly may be, implicated in the plot of the 15/28 June, and who may happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents

officers and civil officials referred to from the Government service should be conditional upon their guilt being first confirmed by means of a trial, the Servian Government restricts its acceptance of our demand to cases where persons are charged with having committed a crime punishable under the provisions of the penal code. Since we, however, demanded the removal of officers and officials who carry on a propaganda hostile to the Monarchy, our demand is palpably not complied with in this respect, for the reason that in Servia the propaganda of which we complain does not constitute an offense punishable by law.

International law and the penal code governing criminal proceedings have nothing whatever to do with this question; this is purely a problem of national polity to be settled by a special mutual arrangement. Servia's reservation is, therefore, unintelligible and, on account of its vague and undefined form, is likely to give rise to insurmountable difficulties in the attainment of a final settlement.

Our demand was perfectly clear and could not be misunderstood. We demanded:

1. The institution of a legal investigation against those who participated in the plot.

2. The coöperation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the inquiry (*recherches*, in contradistinction to *enquête judiciaire*).

or authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an arrangement, as it would constitute a violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases communications as to the results of the investigation in question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

We did not contemplate the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the Servian legal proceedings; these officials were only to coöperate in the preliminary police investigation, which was to seek out and collect the data for the judicial inquiry.

If the Servian Government has misunderstood us, it has done so intentionally, since it must be familiar with the difference between an *enquête judiciaire* (a judicial inquiry) and simple *recherches* (a preliminary police investigation).

Since the Servian Government wishes to evade every form of control in connection with the proposed investigation which, if correctly conducted, would adduce results highly undesirable for that Government; and since it is unable to decline on plausible grounds the coöperation of our officials in the police preliminaries,—a police intervention for which there are a great number of precedents—it has adopted a contention designed to furnish an apparent justification of its refusal to comply with our demand and to make our demand appear impossible of acceptance.

This reply is equivocal.

7. The Royal Government proceeded on the very evening of the delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voja Tankositch.

As regards Milan Ciganovitch, who is a subject of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to the 15th June was employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been

Our investigations have shown that Ciganovitch took a leave of absence three days after the assassination, when it became known that he had participated in the plot; and that under orders from the Belgrade Police Department he proceeded to Ribari. It is, therefore, untrue that Ciganovitch had retired from the

possible to find out his whereabouts. Notices for his apprehension have been published in the press.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is requested to be so good as to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the presumptive evidence of guilt as well as the possible proofs of guilt which have been collected up to the present time, at the inquiry at Serajevo, for the purposes of the Servian inquiry.

8. The Servian Government will reinforce and extend the measures which have been taken for suppressing the illicit traffic in arms and explosives across the frontier.

It goes without saying that the Servian Government will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitz line who have failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of Serajevo to pass.

9. The Royal Government will gladly furnish explanations of the remarks made by its officials, whether in Serbia or abroad, in interviews after the crime, and which, according to the statement of the Imperial and Royal Government, were hostile to the Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government shall have communicated to it the passages in question in these remarks, and as soon as it shall have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials, in connection with which the Royal Government

Government's service as early as the 15/28th of June. In addition, it should be stated that the Chief of the Belgrade Police, who himself had caused Ciganovitch's departure and knew his whereabouts, stated in an interview that no person of the name of Milan Ciganovitch existed in Belgrade.

The interviews here referred to must be well known to the Servian Government. The request that the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish details concerning these interviews, and the fact that the Servian Government reserves the exclusive right to conduct the formal investigation in this matter, prove that on this point, as on others Serbia has no serious intention to accede to our demands.

itself will take steps to collect evidence.

10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the above heads, in-so-far as this has not already been done by the present note, as soon as each measure shall have been ordered and carried out.

If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply the Servian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to take precipitate action in the solution of this question, is ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring this question to the decision of the International Tribunal at The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Servian Government on the 18/31 March, 1909.

Belgrade, July 12/25, 1914.

**XXXV.****Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Berlin, July 28, 1914.

Great Britain's proposal for a conference in London, in which Germany, Italy, Great Britain and France should take part, has been rejected by Germany on the ground that Germany could not bring her ally before a European tribunal for adjudication of Austria-Hungary's differences with Serbia.

**XXXVI.****Baron Müller to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Tokio, July 28, 1914.

To-day's semi-official "Japan Times" concludes an editorial by saying that Japan is on the best of terms with the three Great Powers concerned, namely, Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia, and had no interests whatever in Serbia.

In the event of war the Imperial Government would naturally remain strictly neutral.

**XXXVII.****Count Berchtold to the Royal Servian Foreign Office, Belgrade.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Royal Servian Government having failed to give a satisfactory reply to the note which was handed to it by the Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade on July 23rd, 1914, the Imperial and Royal Government is compelled to protect its own rights and interests, by a recourse to armed force.

Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers herself from now on to be in state of war with Serbia.

**XXXVIII.****Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

For your information and for transmission to the Secretary of State.

I have received from Count Mensdorff the following telegram, dated the 27th inst.:

"I had occasion to-day to explain fully to Sir Edward Grey, that our action does not mean aggression but self-defense and self-preservation, and that we do not contemplate conquest of Servian territory or destruction of Servian independence. We desire to obtain satisfaction for the past and guarantees for the future.

"In so doing I made use of certain points in your instructions to Count Szápáry. Sir Edward Grey said he felt very much disappointed at the fact that we dealt with the Servian reply as if it were a downright refusal.



"He had expected that this reply would furnish a basis upon which the four other governments would be able to elaborate a satisfactory arrangement.

"This had been his idea when he suggested a conference. The conference would meet on the assumption that Austria-Hungary as well as Russia would refrain from all military operations while the other powers endeavored to find a satisfactory solution. (Today's declaration by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons enlarges upon the project of the conference.)

"When he made the suggestion that we should refrain from military operations against Serbia, I expressed the fear that it might possibly be too late.

"The Secretary of State was of the opinion that we were taking a great risk if we were bound, under all circumstances, to make war on Serbia, on the assumption that Russia would remain inactive. Should we be able to persuade Russia to refrain from action, he would have no more to say; if not, the possibilities and dangers were incalculable.

"As a symptom of the feeling of uneasiness prevalent in England, he pointed out that the Great British fleet which had been concentrated in Portsmouth after the manoeuvres and was to have been dispersed to-day, would remain there for the time being. 'We would not have called out any reserves,' he observed, 'but since they are gathered, we cannot send them home at this moment.'

"The object of his suggestion of a conference is to avert a collision among the Great Powers, if possible, and presumably to isolate the conflict. Should Russia mobilize and Germany take action, the project of a conference would automatically fall through.

"It seems to me superfluous to point out to you that Grey's project of a conference has been superseded by the course of events inasmuch as it concerns our conflict with Serbia, in view of the existing state of war."

### XXXIX.

Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

We attach great importance to Sir Edward Grey's impartial appreciation of our action in Serbia in general, and of our rejection of the Servian note in particular. I therefore request you to explain in detail to the Secretary of State the dossier which has been dispatched to you by post, and to emphasize the salient points in it. In the same sense you will discuss with Sir Edward Grey the critical comments on the Servian note (copy of the note together with our comments was dispatched to you by yesterday's post) and make clear to him that Serbia has only apparently met our demands with

the object of deceiving Europe, without giving any guarantee as to the future.

In view of the fact that the Servian Government was fully aware that the unconditional acceptance of our demands alone could satisfy us, the Servian tactics are easily fathomed. Servia has accepted, with various reservations, several of our demands in order to deceive public opinion in Europe, confident that she never would be called upon to carry out her promises. In your conversation with Sir Edward Grey, you will lay particular stress upon the circumstance that the general mobilization of the Servian army was ordered for July the 25th, 3 o'clock P. M., while the reply to our note was handed in shortly before the expiration of the stipulated time, a few minutes before 6 o'clock.

We had previously made no military preparations, but were forced to make them by the Servian mobilization.

## XL.

Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

For your information and guidance:

The Imperial Russian Ambassador called on me to-day to inform me of his return from Russia after a short leave of absence, and at the same time to comply with telegraphic instructions received from M. Sazonow. The latter had informed him of having had a long and friendly conversation with you (re your telegram of the 27th inst.) in the course of which you had, with great readiness, analyzed the different points of Servia's response. M. Sazonow held the opinion that Servia had met our demands to a great extent, but that he considered several of these demands to be unacceptable, a view which he already had communicated to you. Under the circumstances the Servian response appeared to him to furnish the basis for an understanding, to which the Russian Government would willingly lend a hand. M. Sazonow therefore wished to propose that the exchange of views be continued with you and that I should instruct you to that effect.

I replied that I could not agree to such a proposal. Nobody in Austria-Hungary would understand or approve such a discussion of a note which we already had found unsatisfactory. Such a discussion appears all the more impossible since public opinion is already deeply and generally excited, as the Ambassador must be well aware. Moreover, we have declared war on Servia to-day.

The Ambassador's arguments were chiefly to the effect, that we would not stamp out the admitted ill-feeling in Servia by force of arms, but that on the contrary we would inflame it still further. In reply I shed some light upon our actual relations with Servia, which made it inevitable that we should, however reluctantly and without

any underhand design, exert the necessary pressure to make it clear to our restless neighbor that we are irrevocably resolved no longer to permit a movement tolerated by the Servian Government and directed against the existence of the Dual Monarchy. Moreover, Servia's attitude after the receipt of our note was not such as would make possible a peaceful settlement, because Servia, before presenting her unsatisfactory reply, had ordered a general mobilization, and by so doing had committed a hostile act against us. Nevertheless, we had waited three more days.

Yesterday, Servia inaugurated hostilities against us on the Hungarian border. Thus we are compelled to abandon our forbearing attitude toward Servia. It has now been made impossible for us to bring about a complete and peaceful adjustment of relations with Servia, and we are forced to meet the Servian provocations in the only manner compatible with the dignity of the Dual Monarchy under the circumstances.

## XII.

### Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The British Ambassador called on me this morning and, according to instructions, explained Sir Edward Grey's attitude on our controversy with Servia, as follows:

The British Government has followed with great interest the course of the crisis up to date, and wishes to assure us of its sympathy with the stand we have taken and of its thorough understanding of our grievances against Servia.

Although Great Britain has no special concern about our difficulty with Servia as such, the London Cabinet could not ignore the conflict, inasmuch as it involves the possibility of extending into widening eddies and thereby endangering the peace of Europe.

Only on this ground was Sir Edward Grey prompted to invite the Governments of the countries not directly interested in this conflict (Germany, Italy and France) to examine all the possibilities by a continuous exchange of views and to consider methods of as speedy a settlement as possible. The Secretary of State considers it expedient that, following the precedent of the London Conference during the last Balkan crisis, the Ambassadors of the aforesaid States in London should keep in continuous touch with him.

Sir Edward Grey already has received responses in which the above-mentioned Governments expressed their cordial assent to his suggestion. For the present the Secretary of State would desire, if possible, to prevent at the eleventh hour the outbreak of hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Servia. Should this, however, not be possible, he was anxious to avoid a bloody collision, possibly by induc-

ing Serbia to withdraw her troops without giving battle. Serbia's reply to us seems to offer the basis for an understanding, in the opinion of Sir Edward Grey. England, he intimated, was willing to use her influence in this direction, subject to our desire.

I thanked the Ambassador for Sir Edward Grey's communication, and replied that I fully appreciated the views of the Secretary of State. His point of view, however, necessarily differs from mine, since Great Britain has no direct interest in our dispute with Serbia, and because the Secretary of State could hardly be thoroughly cognizant of the seriousness and importance of the pending questions for the Dual Monarchy. Sir Edward Grey's suggestions concerning the possibility of preventing an outbreak of hostilities are somewhat belated since, as early as yesterday, the Servians had opened fire on our frontier-guards, and also because we declared war upon Serbia to-day. Referring to the idea of an exchange of views on the basis of the Servian response, I have to decline the suggestion. We had demanded an unqualified acceptance. Serbia had endeavored to extricate herself from an embarrassing situation by means of quibbles. With such tactics we were only too familiar.

I added that Sir Maurice de Bunsen's personal experience surely placed him in a position to appreciate fully our standpoint and to explain it accurately to Sir Edward Grey.

Inasmuch as Sir Edward Grey is desirous to serve the cause of European peace, he certainly will meet with no opposition from us. But he should realize that the peace of Europe would not be preserved if Great Powers stood behind Serbia and assured her of impunity. Suppose, even, that we agreed to attempt such a compromise, Serbia as a result would only be encouraged to persevere in her old tactics—a situation which would once more endanger peace in a very short time.

The British Ambassador assured me that he perfectly understood our standpoint; but, on the other hand, he regretted that, under the circumstances, there was no chance of attaining the British Government's desire to bring about a peaceful compromise. He hoped to be allowed to remain in touch with me, particularly on account of the grave danger of a European conflagration.

I replied that I was always at the Ambassador's disposal, and with this the interview terminated.

## XLII.

**Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

I request you to call at once on the Imperial Chancellor or on the Secretary of State and to convey to him the following in my behalf:

According to corroborative news from St. Petersburg, Kieff, Warsaw, Moscow and Odessa, Russia is making extensive military preparations. M. Sazonow, however, as well as the Russian Minister of War, have given their word of honor that a mobilization had not yet been ordered. The latter Minister, however, has advised the German military attaché that the military districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan, which adjoin Austria-Hungary, would be mobilized if our troops crossed the Servian border.

Under these circumstances I would urgently request the Berlin Cabinet to consider whether Russia's attention should not be called, in a friendly manner, to the fact that the mobilization of the above-mentioned districts would be equivalent to a threat to Austro-Hungary, and that should it actually occur it would have to be met by Austria-Hungary and her ally, the German Empire, with the most comprehensive military counter-measures.

In order to facilitate the possible adoption of a more conciliatory attitude by Russia, we think it advisable that such a move should be initiated by Germany, alone, although we would, of course, be prepared to join in the action.

Plain language would seem to me to be the most effective measure at this moment, in order to bring home to Russia the lengths to which her menacing attitude may lead.

### XLIII.

**Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 28, 1914.

The Imperial German Ambassador has advised me that Sir Edward Grey has approached the German Government with a request that it use its influence with the Imperial and Royal Government to the effect that the latter either consider the reply from Belgrade satisfactory or else accept it as a basis for discussions between the cabinets.

Herr von Tschirschky was instructed to submit the British proposal to the Vienna cabinet for its consideration.

### XLIV.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburg, London, Paris and Rome.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

For your information:

I have conveyed to the Imperial German Ambassador to-day, the following memorandum in reply to a communication by him:

### MEMOIR.

The Austro-Hungarian Government has noted with profound thanks the communication which the Imperial German Ambassador

transmitted to it on the 28th instant, by request of the British cabinet, to the effect that the Imperial German Government use its influence with the Vienna cabinet in an effort to induce the latter, either to approve the response from Belgrade or else to accept it as a basis for discussions.

Referring to the communication made by the British Secretary of State to Prince Lichnowsky, the Imperial and Royal Government wishes to point out, in the first place, that Serbia's reply by no means conveys an assent to all our demands with one sole exception, as Sir Edward Grey seems to assume, but on the contrary, contains reservations in almost every clause, so that the value of the concessions is essentially reduced. The clause which has been entirely rejected covers the very points which would have afforded us some guarantee for the realization of our object.

The Imperial and Royal Government cannot conceal its surprise at the assumption that its action against Serbia was aimed at Russia and Russian influence in the Balkans, a supposition which would imply that the propaganda against the Dual Monarchy is not only Servian but also of Russian origin.

Hitherto we have presumed that official Russian circles had no connection with the agitation against the Dual Monarchy, and our present action is directed solely against Serbia, while our sentiments toward Russia are perfectly friendly, as we can assure Sir Edward Grey.

At the same time the Austro-Hungarian Government must point out that, to its sincere regret, it no longer is in a position to meet the Servian reply in the spirit of the British suggestions, since at the time when the German request was presented here, a state of war already existed between Dual Monarchy and Serbia, and thus the Servian reply had been superseded by events.

The Imperial and Royal Government wishes to call attention to the fact that the Royal Servian Government has proceeded to the mobilization of the Servian forces before it replied to our note, and subsequently has allowed three days to elapse without showing any disposition to modify its point of view, whereupon we have declared war.

Should the British Cabinet be prepared to exert its influence upon the Russian Government for the maintenance of peace among the Great Powers, and for a localization of the war which had been forced upon us by the Servian agitation of many years' standing, such efforts would meet with the Imperial and Royal Government's appreciation.

**Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Paris, July 29, 1914.

France undoubtedly is making military preparations as announced by the newspapers, though the latter may possibly be exaggerating. According to strictly confidential information, Baron Schoen has been instructed to touch upon the topic of these military preparations with M. Viviani to-day, and to point out that under the circumstances, Germany might be compelled to adopt similar measures, which, of course, could not be concealed and which would cause great excitement when they should become known to the public.

Thus both countries, though only desirous of peace, might be driven to at least a partial mobilization, which would be dangerous.

Moreover Baron Schoen, acting on instructions, will also declare that Germany anxiously desires that the conflict between us and Servia shall remain localized, and that Germany counts on the support of France on this point.

## XLVI.

**Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

As early as Sunday the German Government declared at St. Petersburg that a mobilization by Russia would be followed by a mobilization by Germany.

Thereupon the Russian Government replied in the sense of my telegram of the 27th instant. Another telegram was sent to St. Petersburg to-day, to the effect that Germany may be compelled to mobilize if Russia carries on her mobilization any further.

## XLVII.

**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, July 29, 1914.

On information received from the German Ambassador that M. Sazonow appeared greatly disturbed by your apparent unwillingness to continue discussions with Russia and by the Austro-Hungarian order of mobilization, which appears to him to exceed the necessary scope and therefore is believed to be directed against Russia, I called upon the Minister in an attempt to clear up misconceptions which seemed to exist.

The Minister asserted that Austria-Hungary had refused point blank to discuss matters any further. In accordance with your telegram of the 28th instant, I explained that in view of recent events, you certainly had refused to discuss any further the wording of the notes and our conflict with Servia in general; that, on the other hand, I have to state that I was in a position to open a much wider

field for discussion by declaring that we do not wish to interfere with any Russian interests and that we do not intend to take any Servian territory; provided, always, that the conflict be localized between Austria-Hungary and Servia; that, moreover, we did not intend to violate Servia's sovereignty. I expressed my firm conviction that you would always be willing to keep in touch with St. Petersburg with regard to Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.

M. Sazonow replied that he felt reassured on the territorial question, but that he must adhere to his former view that the enforcement of our demand would place Servia in a condition of vassalage; that such an event would affect the equilibrium of the Balkans and thereby would infringe upon Russian interests. He then reverted to the discussion of the note, to Sir Edward Grey's action, etc., and again suggested that he recognized our legitimate interests and wished to satisfy them fully, but that this should be done in a manner acceptable to Servia. I rejoined that these were not Russian but Servian interests, whereupon Sazonow retorted that in this case Russian interests were identical with Servian interests. In order to find an issue from this vicious circle, I passed to another topic.

I observed that it had been brought to my notice that some apprehension was felt in Russia, because we had mobilized eight army corps for action against Servia. M. Sazonow stated that not he but the Chief of the General Staff had expressed uneasiness, and that he himself knew nothing about it. I endeavored to convince M. Sazonow that any unbiased person could be easily convinced that our southern army corps could not be a menace to Russia.

I pointed out to the Minister that it might be well to inform his Imperial Majesty, the Czar, of the true situation, the more so, because it is urgently necessary for the preservation of the peace that an immediate stop be put to this race in military preparations, which appeared imminent as the result of this information. M. Sazonow said in a significant manner—and his observation shed an illuminating light upon the situation—that he would inform the Chief of the General Staff, as that officer conferred with His Majesty every day.

The Minister also said that an Ukase was being signed to-day, ordering a somewhat extensive mobilization. He could, however, declare in an absolutely official way that these forces were not intended for a sudden attack upon us, but would be kept under arms in case Russia's interests in the Balkans should be menaced. An explanatory note, he said, would confirm this assurance that it was only a question of a precautionary measure, which Czar Nicholas had deemed justifiable on the ground that we not only have the advantage of a quicker mobilization, but also have the benefit of so long a start. I emphatically drew Sazonow's attention to the impression which such measures are bound to create in Austria-Hungary. I expressed my



doubts as to whether the explanatory note would be able to soften that impression, whereupon Sazonow reiterated his assurance that this measure is absolutely inoffensive (!)

### XLVIII.

#### Count Berchtold to Count Szögyény, Berlin.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 29, 1914.

Herr von Tschirschky has just told me that the Russian Ambassador has informed him that his Government had communicated to him the fact that the Military Districts of Kieff, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan would be mobilized. Russia considers her honor as a great power to have been offended, and therefore she has been obliged to take adequate measures. The Russian mobilization is being confirmed by our generals commanding the Army Corps in Galicia, and, according to our Military Attaché was not denied by M. Sazonow in his conference with the German Ambassador.

You are instructed to convey the above information to the German Government without delay and to point out emphatically that for military reasons our general mobilization will have to be ordered at once, unless the Russian mobilization is stopped immediately.

As a last attempt to avert a European war, I consider it desirable that our Envoy and the German Representative in St. Petersburg, and if necessary also in Paris, be instructed at once to explain in an amicable way to the respective Governments that the continuation of the Russian mobilization would provoke counter-measures in Germany and Austria-Hungary, which necessarily would lead to the most serious consequences. You will add, that it is self-evident that we cannot allow any interference with our armed action in Servia.

The Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in St. Petersburg and Paris are being simultaneously instructed to make the above declaration as soon as their German colleagues receive the same instructions.

### XLIX.

#### Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

In reply to your telegram of July 29th, I am still ready, as before, to allow you to explain to M. Sazonow the individual points in our note to Servia, which has since been superseded by events. In this connection I would also make a point of discussing in a frank and friendly manner the questions which directly concern our relations with Russia, in accordance with the suggestion transmitted to me by M. Schebeko. From such a discussion, it is to be hoped, may result the elimination of the unfortunate misconception in this particular matter, as well as the peaceful development of our good relations with Russia.

**Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 30, 1914.

For your information and guidance:

I have explained to M. Schebeko to-day, that it had been reported to me that M. Sazonow was painfully impressed by my flat rejection of his suggestion of a conference between you and himself, and also because no exchange of views had taken place between myself and M. Schebeko.

With regard to the first proposal, I had already instructed you by telegraph to give M. Sazonow any explanation he might require concerning our note, although recent events have superseded that note. Such an explanation, however, could be confined to only belated elucidation, as we had intended never to abate any point in the note. I also stated that I had authorized you to make our relations with Russia the subject of an amicable exchange of views with M. Sazonow. The complaint that there had been no conference between myself and Schebeko must be based on a misunderstanding, as we—Schebeko and I—had discussed the pending questions only two days ago. The Ambassador confirmed this and said that he had sent a full report of our interview to M. Sazonow.

M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Serbia had caused such anxiety in St. Petersburg. He asserted that we, as a Great Power, were taking action against the small Servian State, without conveying any knowledge of our intention at St. Petersburg, as to whether we would infringe upon its Sovereignty, overthrow it, or even crush it out of existence. Being connected with Serbia by historic and other ties, Russia could not remain indifferent to Serbia's fate. Every attempt has been made in St. Petersburg to impress upon Belgrade the necessity of complying with our demands. This, however, at a time when it could not have been known what demands we would formulate.

But even now, after the demands have been made, every influence would be exerted, I was assured, to obtain all possible concessions to our wishes. I begged the Ambassador to remember that we had repeatedly stated that we were not following a policy of conquest in Serbia, that we did not intend to infringe upon her Sovereignty, but that we merely desired to attain a solution which would afford us a guarantee against further agitations on the part of Serbia. In enlarging upon the subject of our intolerable relations with Serbia, I plainly gave Schebeko to understand to what extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for this state of things, though surely against the inclination of the leading men in Russia.

In the course of our conversation I referred to the Russian mobilization, which had meanwhile been brought to my knowledge. Since

the mobilization is restricted to the military districts of Odessa, Kieff, Moscow and Kazan, it bears the character of a hostile demonstration against the Dual Monarchy. The cause of this measure is unknown to me, since there is no matter in dispute between us and Russia. Austria-Hungary has mobilized her troops solely against Serbia, and not one man against Russia. The very fact that the Ist, Xth, and XIth army corps have not been mobilized, bears out my statement. Since Russia is obviously mobilizing against us, we are compelled to extend our own mobilization; I, however, wish to point out expressly, that this measure should not be considered as a hostile act against Russia, but simply as a response to the Russian mobilization.

I asked M. Schebeko to report the above to his Government, which he undertook to do.

## LL.

### Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Ambassadors in London and St. Petersburg.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

I am telegraphing to Berlin as follows:

Herr von Tschirschky, acting on instructions, informed me yesterday of a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and Prince Lichnowsky, in the course of which the Secretary of State made the following declaration to the German Ambassador:

Sazonow has made known to the British Government that, since Austria-Hungary has declared war on Serbia, he was no longer in a position to treat directly with Austria-Hungary, and therefore requested Great Britain to resume her mediation. As a condition of this mediation, however, the Russian Government stipulates the suspension of hostilities in the meanwhile.

Commenting upon this Russian suggestion, Sir Edward Grey told Prince Lichnowsky that Great Britain was considering a plan of mediation *à quatre*, and held such mediation to be urgent and essential for the avoidance of a general war.

You are instructed to thank the Secretary of State warmly for the communication made by Herr von Tschirschky and to express our readiness to consider Sir Edward Grey's proposition to mediate between us and Serbia despite the changes brought about in the situation by Russia's mobilization.

Our acceptance, however, is subject to the condition that our military action against Serbia shall nevertheless proceed and that the British Cabinet shall induce the Russian Government to stop the mobilization directed against us. It is understood that in this case we would at once cancel our defensive military counter-measures in Galicia, which had been forced upon us by Russia's mobilization.

**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Early this morning an order was issued for the general mobilization of the entire army and navy.

## LIII.

**Count Berchtold to the Imperial and Royal Embassies, Legations and Consulates.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, July 31, 1914.

For your information and for use at the respective Governments:

In response to Russian Government's order for mobilization at our frontier we are forced to take similar measures in Galicia.

These measures are of a purely defensive character and are solely due to the pressure of the Russian preparations, which we greatly regret, as we have no aggressive intentions whatever against Russia, and desire the continuation of the same friendly relations as heretofore.

Negotiations dealing with the situation are proceeding between the cabinets at Vienna and at St. Petersburg, and we still hope that they may lead to a general understanding.

## LIV.

**Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Paris, July 31, 1914.

The German Ambassador, on instructions from his Government, has made a declaration here to the effect that, if the Russian general mobilization shall not be stopped within twelve hours, Germany also will mobilize. At the same time Baron Schoen inquired whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German war. He requested an answer to this question within eighteen hours. The time-limit expires to-morrow, Saturday, at 1 o'clock P. M.

## LV.

**Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, July 31, 1914.

Received your telegram of the 30th inst. My telegram of the 29th inst. will have acquainted you with the fact that I had resumed the exchange of views with M. Sazonow without waiting for instructions and practically on the basis now suggested by you, without succeeding, however, in bringing the conflicting viewpoints nearer to an agreement.

Meanwhile the conversations between the German Ambassador and the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs have made it clear that Russia would not be content even with a formal declaration by Aus-

tria-Hungary that she would not reduce Servian territory, nor infringe upon her Sovereignty, nor violate any Russian interest in the Balkans, or elsewhere. Moreover, Russia has, since then, ordered a general mobilization.

## LVI.

### Count Szápáry to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.)

St. Petersburg, August 1, 1914.

On my visit to M. Sazonow to-day, I declared that I had received certain instructions, but that I was not aware of the situation created in Vienna by the Russian general mobilization.

Therefore, in carrying out the instructions which had been despatched to me before that event, I could not take into account the newly-created situation. I said that the two points of your instructions dealt with the misunderstanding arising out of our refusal to discuss matters any further with Russia. As I had said even before I was authorized to do so, this conception is erroneous. I pointed out that you were not only willing to enter into negotiations with Russia on a most comprehensive basis, but even to discuss the wording of out note, inasmuch, as it was only a question of interpretation.

I emphasized the point that your instructions once more bear out your good intentions; that I was still ignorant of the effect produced in Vienna by the Russian general mobilization and that I could but hope that events might not yet have carried us too far. In any case I considered it my duty at the present momentous juncture to furnish another proof of the good will of the Austro-Hungarian Government.

M. Sazonow in reply, expressed his satisfaction at this evidence of our good intentions, but observed that for obvious reasons the neutral ground of London would promise better success for the proposed negotiations than St. Petersburg. I replied that you desired to be in direct touch with St. Petersburg, and that I was consequently unable to give an opinion on the suggestion, but would not fail to convey it to you.

## LVII.

### Count Szögyény to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.)

Berlin, August 2, 1914.

The Secretary of State has just advised me that no reply to the German inquiry has arrived from Russia.

Russian troops have crossed the German border near Schwiddin (southeast of Bialla). Russia has, therefore, attacked Germany. Germany consequently considers herself to be in state of war with Russia.

The Russian Ambassador was handed his passports this forenoon; he probably will leave to-day.

**Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

London, August 4, 1914.

I have just seen Sir Edward Grey. The British Government has addressed an ultimatum to Germany on the subject of Belgium. He expects reply at midnight.

Sir Edward Grey holds, that meanwhile, there was no reason for a similar communciation to the Imperial and Royal Government, and no cause for a conflict with us, as long as we are not at war with France. He hoped we would not open hostilities without a previous formal declaration of war. He will not recall Sir M. de Bunsen.

Should we enter into a state of war with France, Great Britain, as an ally of France, would find it difficult to coöperate with the latter in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean.

**LIX.****Count Berchtold to Count Szápáry, St. Petersburg.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 5, 1914.

You are instructed to hand the following note to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"By order of his Government, the undersigned Ambassador of Austria-Hungary has the honor to notify His Excellency, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, as follows:

"In view of the threatening attitude assumed by Russia in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia, and in view of the fact that, in consequence of this conflict, and according to a communication of the Berlin Cabinet, Russia has considered it necessary to open hostilities against Germany; furthermore, in view of the fact that the latter consequently has entered into a state of war with the former Power, Austria-Hungary considers herself equally in a state of war with Russia."

After having presented this note, you will ask for the return of your passports and take your departure without delay accompanied by the entire staff of the Embassy, with the sole exception of those officials who may have to remain.

Simultaneously passports are being handed to M. Schebeko.

**LX.****Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 6, 1914.

Received your telegram of the 6th inst.

You are instructed to assure Sir Edward Grey, that we shall under no circumstances begin hostilities against Great Britain without previous formal declaration of war, but that we also expect Great Britain to act on the same principle.

## Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.)

Paris, August 8, 1914.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has sent for me and has informed me that the Innsbruck army corps has been dispatched to the French frontier, according to positive information received by him. M. Doumergue urgently desires to know whether this information is correct, and in the event of the affirmative to know the Imperial and Royal Government's intentions. France being at war with Germany, such a movement of troops to the French border is, in his opinion, incompatible with the state of peace existing between Austria-Hungary and France. M. Dumaine is instructed to make a similar representation to you.

## LXII.

## Count Berchtold to Count Szécsen, Paris.

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 9, 1914.

Re your telegram of the 8th inst.

On information received from General Staff I authorize you to declare to the French Government that news of participation of our troops in the Franco-German war is a pure invention. I have made an identical declaration to M. Dumaine.

## LXIII.

## Count Szécsen to Count Berchtold.

(Telegram.)

Paris, August 10, 1914.

Received telegram of 9th August.

Immediately communicated contents to M. Doumergue. The Minister, having received a similar telegraphic report from M. Dumaine concerning his conversation with you, is satisfied that our troops are not on the French frontier, but says that he has positive information that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been transported to Germany, thus enabling the latter to withdraw her own troops from the German territories now occupied by our forces. In the Minister's view this facilitates the military operations of the Germans.

I have repeatedly called the Minister's attention to the wording of your reply; he recognizes that there could be no question of an active participation of our troops in the Franco-German war, but insists that the presence of our troops on German territory is undeniable and represents military support to Germany. Under these circumstances he has instructed the French Ambassador in Vienna to ask immediately for his passports and to leave Vienna with the entire staff of the Embassy, to-day.

The Minister told me that, under the circumstances, my presence here could be of no avail, but owing to public excitement, might even

give rise to unpleasant incidents which he would like to avoid. He offered to have a special train ready to-night for my conveyance out of France. I replied that it would be impossible for me to obtain instructions from you by to-night, but in view of the recall of M. Du-maine, I begged him to have my passports handed to me.

#### LXIV.

**Count Berchtold to Count Mensdorff, London.**

Vienna, August 11, 1914.

The French Government has instructed its Ambassador here to ask for his passports on the ground that an Austro-Hungarian army corps has been sent to Germany, thereby enabling the German military authorities to withdraw their troops from the German territories now occupied by our forces.

This move by our General Staff is considered to constitute military support to Germany.

You are instructed to assure the British Government that this French assertion, according to authentic information, is unfounded.

#### LXV.

**Count Mensdorff to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

London, August 12, 1914.

I have just received from Sir Edward Grey the following communication:

"By request of the French Government, which no longer is able to communicate directly with your Government, I wish to inform you of the following:

"After having declared war on Servia and having thus initiated hostilities in Europe, the Austro-Hungarian Government has, without any provocation on the part of the Government of the French Republic, entered into a state of war with France.

1st: "After Germany had declared war successively upon Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government has intervened in this conflict by declaring war on Russia, which was already in alliance with France.

2nd: "According to manifold and reliable information Austria has sent troops to the German border under circumstances which constitute a direct menace to France.

"In view of these facts the French Government considers itself compelled to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that it will take all measures necessary to meet the actions and menaces of the latter."

Sir Edward Grey added: "A rupture with France having thus been brought about, the Government of His Britannic Majesty is obliged to proclaim a state of war between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary, to begin at midnight."



The Japanese Ambassador to Count Berchtold.

Monsieur le Comte:

Vienna, August 20, 1914.

No doubt you already have been informed by Baron Müller of the nature of the communication made to the German Government by my Government on the 15th inst.; but, for your personal information, I beg to enclose herewith a copy of a telegram received from Tokio on the subject, although I have no instruction to do so.

ENCLOSURE.

The Japanese Government, taking into serious consideration the present situation, and as the result of full communication with the British Government for the purpose of consolidating and maintaining the general peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, which forms one of the objects of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, have come to the decision of taking the necessary measures therefore in common with Great Britain; but before taking such measures, the Japanese Government thought it proper to once approach the German Government with a friendly advice which was communicated to them to the following effect on the 15th of August, 1914:

1. All German vessels of war to be immediately withdrawn from the waters in the neighborhood of Japan and China. The vessels which cannot be so withdrawn, to be disarmed.
2. The German Government to deliver, unconditionally and without compensation, to the Japanese authorities, the entire leased territory of Kiau-Chau before the 16th of September, 1914, for the purpose of returning it to China.

The Japanese Government has declared to the German Government that unless their reply of unconditional acceptance of the above advice should be received before noon of Sunday, the 23rd instant, the Japanese Government shall take such action as they deem necessary.

It is sincerely hoped that the above advice, with such ample allowance of time for reply, may be accepted by the German Government; but should unfortunately, the German Government not accept the advice of the Japanese Government, the latter will be obliged to take the necessary measures in order to accomplish their object.

The reason that led the Imperial Government to assume the present attitude is, already mentioned, none other than to safeguard the common interests of Japan and Great Britain mentioned in the Anglo-Japanese alliance by consolidating the foundation of permanent peace in the regions of Eastern Asia, and the Japanese Government have no intention whatever of embarking on a policy of territorial expansion or any other design of self-interest. Consequently, the Imperial Japanese Government are resolved to respect, with the utmost care, the interests of third powers in Eastern Asia and not in the least to injure them.

## LXVII.

**Count Berchtold to Count Clary, Brussels.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 22, 1914.

I request you to inform the Royal Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs without delay, as follows:

By order of my Government I have the honor to notify you, as follows:

In view of the fact that Belgium, having refused to accept the propositions addressed to her on several occasions by Germany, is now in military coöperation with France and Great Britain, both of which have declared war on Austria-Hungary; and in view of the recently established fact that Austrian and Hungarian subjects resident in Belgium have, under the eyes of the Royal authorities, been treated in a manner contrary to the most primitive laws of humanity, and inadmissible even toward subjects of a hostile State, Austria-Hungary is necessarily compelled to break off diplomatic relations and considers herself from now on in a state of war with Belgium.

I leave the country with the staff of the Legation and place the subjects of my country under the protection of the Minister of the United States of America in Belgium.

The Imperial and Royal Government has handed his passports to Count Errembault de Dudzeem.

## LXVIII.

**Prince Hohenlohe to Count Berchtold.**

(Telegram.)

Berlin, August 23, 1914.

The Japanese Minister here has been informed by the Foreign Office that the German Imperial Government had no intention to reply to the Japanese ultimatum. The German Government has instructed its Ambassador in Tokio to leave Japan upon the expiration of the time-limit fixed by Japan for noon to-day. Simultaneously the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires is to be handed his passports.

At noon the Chargé d'Affaires received his passports; he will leave Berlin to-morrow morning with the Staff of the Embassy.

## LXIX.

**Count Berchtold to Baron Müller, Tokio.**

(Telegram.)

Vienna, August 24, 1914.

The Commander of H. M. S. "Elisabeth" has been instructed to participate in the action at Tsingtau.

In view of Japan's action against our ally, the German Empire, I request you to ask for your passports, notify Consulates and leave Japan for America together with our colony and the Staffs of Embassy and Consulates. You will place our subjects and interests under the protection of the American Ambassador. Passports will be handed to Japanese Ambassador here.





















